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1 Free Culture in  Context:  Property and the Politics of 
Free Software
“And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination,
That, if it would but apprehend some joy,
It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
Or in the night, imagining some fear,
How easy is a bush supposed a bear!”
(Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, 5.1.7).
1.1 Introduction.  
We  have  seen  how  anti-capitalism  and  notions  of  global 
solidarity  and  egalitarian  forms  of  resistance  are  as  old  as 
capitalism and refuse to disappear. In this chapter I consider the 
dynamics of social movements that have emerged in cyberspace 
and which are related to Free Software. With social movements 
that have emerged in cyberspace I do not mean for instance a 
feminist networking website, but specifically social movements 
that have given birth to and been born into cyberspace.
I  explore  those  dynamics  in  cyberspace  through  the  lens  of 
number of key commentators, whose ideas are best described as 
a mixture of liberal economics, libertarian views, an enthusiasm 
for  the  public  domain7,  and  technological  fetishism.  Common 
7 Copyright and patent law are forms of property relations with the specific 
view  to  balance  the  rights  and  benefits  between  individual  (or  group) 
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among  them  is  the  refusal  to  address  the  crucial  aspects  of 
ownership  in  the  tangible  realm  –  land,  resources,  means  of 
production  and  distribution.  They  do embrace  the  values  of 
sharing  and  cooperating,  but  confine  them  to  the  intangible 
realm: ideas, knowledge, information. For that reason I call them 
information exceptionalists.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how and why information 
exceptionalism  is  incompatible  with  anti-capitalism.  It  is 
incompatible because it takes for granted that whatever powers 
are given by the existing private property rights regime in the 
tangible  realm  need  no  questioning,  or,  at  best,  that  any 
inequalities that do exist in that realm can be addressed through 
commoning in the intangible realm.
In  other  words,  the  distinction  between  the  tangible  and 
intangible  realms that  is  assumed in economistic  thinking and 
information  exceptionalism  is  rejected.  It  is  presented  as  a 
misleading starting point for thinking about the world, because it 
is  detached from the moral,  political  and social  concerns  that 
arises  in  the  tangible  realm.  The  most  obvious  problem  of 
treating cyberspace as part of an intangible realm that is separate 
from the tangible realm is that no virtual space exists without a 
creators  and  the  general  public.  The  public  domain  is  at  bottom  a 
consequence of copyright: whenever my exclusive right to copy runs out,  
the  creation  to  which  I  had  such  exclusive  right  enters  into  the  public 
domain in order that society at large can benefit from it through their own 
uses,  not  just  through  my  controlled  (or  withheld)  circulation  of  the 
creation.  Copyright  temporarily delimits individuals as creators from the 
public who become ultimately the benefiting party to the arrangement: I get 
to exploit my great idea for some time, and in the end we are all happy in 
the public domain. The relation between copyright and the public domain, 
which  is  one  of  complementarity,  has  been  widely  explored  and  is  an 
uncontested position (but see, e.g. Dusollier 2007).
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material  underpinning.  The  more  deep-seated  problem  is  that 
control  over  the  material  foundation  -  by  extension  -  is  also 
control over the intangible realm that can be based upon it.  It 
follows that a conception of the world in which such a distinction 
is assumed as basic to social organisation cannot account for the 
interpenetration of the tangible and the intangible realms, neither 
can it  account  for  the  environmental  impact  of  those material 
foundations. It can only ever tell half the story and that story is 
always liable to be subverted unexpectedly by the other half.
Free  Software  as  an  example  of  technology  that  is  socially 
embedded and socially controlled, shows us how technology can 
be liberating8. As a commons, the Free Software movement, as 
we shall see, has taken control of the development of a resource, 
which  shows how technology can  become a  common project, 
where transparency and public scrutinisability are embedded in 
the relational  modalities and community building processes  of 
the  commons.  It  is  a  commons  that  grows  and  that  is  self-
governed, and which governs a technological resource that is free 
for  all  to  use  (without  leading  to  a  free-for-all).  Hence,  Free 
Software has a subversive potential. I will show that the concept 
of property is central to an understanding of these political and 
8 In the context of globalisation questions concerning technology are central, 
because  “technology  drives  globalisation  and  globalisation  drives 
technology” (Novotny, Mordini , Chadwick, Pedersen, Fabbri et al. 2006). 
Technology  is  not  neutral  or  autonomous,  it  does  not  determine  social 
realities, but it gives shape to our lives to the exact degree that we need to 
invest  agency  in  its  development  and  use  in  order  to  stay  in  charge. 
Technology is like a playground, at best, or at worst our second nature, an 
environment  in  which we  are  condemned to  live.  Technology is  a  very 
social and material part of human reality and the way we interact with it has 
a great impact on our social relations, our mind and being, and the natural 
environment. Technology thus serves as a good general starting point for an 
inquiry into contemporary politics.
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technological  processes  and  that  realising  the  subversive 
potential turns on accepting a social analysis of property, which 
does  not  reject  property in  the  intangible  realm,  but  seeks its 
reform conceptually and in the tangible realm.
This  chapter,  then,  is  a  critical  investigation  of  information 
exceptionalism and social relations in cyberspace. My discussion 
will  focus on the concept  of  property and – recursively – ask 
critical  questions  about  the  ways  in  which  the  concept  of 
property is often (mis-)understood.
Seeing  how  contemporary  analyses  deliberately  conceptualise 
property in a misleading manner and how this approach largely 
leaves ownership in the “tangible realm” unquestioned will lead 
us to Chapter 2. Here I will present a definition of property that 
draws  upon  cultural  anthropology,  legal  positivism,  liberal 
jurisprudence and social movements to reanimate philosophical 
debate about  the role of property. I will  do so with a view to  
providing social movements – especially anti-capitalists – with 
an embryonic framework for understanding property relations. In 
turn, such an understanding can be integrated into the political 
programme of  radical  social  movements  that  are  rejecting the 
nation  state  and  the  private  ownership  of  ideas,  knowledge, 
information and,  most  importantly,  land,  its  resources,  and the 
means of production and distribution. 
If  in  the  introduction the revolutionary question was  “How?”, 
which  we  answered  was  a  process  of  self-articulation  and 
organisation, then one of the first questions that follow is “With 
what?”. The answer to that is property.
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1.2 Beyond property: promises of the networked information   
society.
“A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace: 
Governments  of  the  Industrial  World,  you  weary 
giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, 
the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I 
ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not 
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where 
we  gather  ...  Your  legal  concepts  of  property, 
expression, identity, movement, and context do not 
apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there 
is no matter here.” (Barlow 1996).
1.2.1 Cyberdreams: like fire, like air.
I begin with a brief, selective overview of what we can call the 
visions of cyberspace, before turning to the technical aspects of 
the Internet.
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace is written by 
the American  libertarian celebrity,  John Perry Barlow.  Barlow 
was one of the main lyricists for the legendary counter-cultural, 
psychedelic rock band, called the Grateful Dead. The declaration 
is rooted in the American Dream and should be understood in the 
context of the rest of Barlow's body of work. For instance, he is a 
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which is a not-
for-profit  NGO that  promotes  digital  rights  and  public  policy 
analysis that furthers the free flow of information and ideas. The 
EFF  also  provides  support  in  litigation  that  touches  upon 
constitutional  liberties  and  freedoms  of  speech  and 
communication.
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Two  years  before  declaring  the  independence  of  cyberspace, 
Barlow wrote  an article  in  which he set  out  the  metaphysical 
“otherness” of informational flows in cyberspace, as opposed to 
the metaphysics of tangible things. The world of material things, 
for  Barlow,  is  defined  by  “substance”,  whereas  cyberspace  is 
defined by “flow”; or conversely, as Barlow notes, cyberspace is 
a “world made more of verbs than nouns” (1994). The article was 
called  “The  Economy of  Ideas:  A framework  for  patents  and 
copyrights  in  the  Digital  Age.  (Everything  you  know  about 
intellectual  property  is  wrong)”  and  was  published  in  Wired 
Magazine, which gained a good reputation for cyberspace hype 
(see  Turner  2006).  Commencing with  a  since  then oft  quoted 
statement by Thomas Jefferson, one of the Founding Fathers of 
the Land of the Free, Barlow wants to make sure that the reader 
understands that he has a historical grounding of his position that 
reflects the values of freedom and liberty. The Jefferson quote 
ends by stating:
“[t]hat  ideas  should  freely  spread  from  one  to 
another  over  the  globe,  for  the  moral  and mutual 
instruction  of  man,  and  improvement  of  his 
condition,  seems  to  have  been  peculiarly  and 
benevolently  designed  by  nature,  when  she  made 
them,  like  fire,  expansible  over  all  space,  without 
lessening their density at any point, and like the air 
in which we breathe, move, and have our physical 
being,  incapable  of  confinement  or  exclusive 
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be 
a subject of property" (ibid.)
Barlow also integrates another tradition in his writing,  namely 
cybernetics,  which  had  become  part  of  the  counter-cultural 
imaginary through the works of multi-multifarious thinkers like 
Gregory  Bateson  and  the  networking  skills  of  Stewart  Brand 
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(Turner 2006). In that way Barlow connects libertarian ideas with 
the promises of systems that were self-organised and argued - in 
extension  of  Bateson's  famous  statement  “information  is  a 
difference  which  makes  a  difference”  -  that  in  cyberspace 
“information only really exists in the Delta. The making of that 
difference is an activity within a relationship.  Information is an  
action which occupies time rather than a state of being which 
occupies physical space, as is the case with hard goods. It is the 
pitch, not the baseball, the dance, not the dancer” (Barlow 1994; 
emphasis added).
The  novel  terrain  of  cyberspace  embedded  in  a  “liquid 
architecture”9 (Novak n.d.) was indeed a new electronic frontier 
where  technological  yeomen  were  staking  their  claims  and 
expanding the horizon of what is possible. These frontiers were 
perhaps  first  conceptualised  and  popularised  by  Marshall 
McLuhan,  who  in  1968  coined  the  term  “global  village” 
(McLuhan and Fiore 1997) to suggest what impact new media 
and communication technologies were having upon the human 
kind. McLuhan pondered and probed what it meant to be living 
in an inter-connected global village - in the active relationship 
that  information as a flowing movement entails.  He suggested 
that  it  would have a profound impact on the very way people 
think,  communicate  with  and  understand  each  other  and  the 
world. He wrote:
“...might  not  our  current  translation  of  our  entire 
lives into the spiritual form of information seem to 
9 “Marcos Novak defines liquid architectures … A liquid architecture is an 
architecture whose form is contingent on the interests of the beholder; it is  
an architecture that opens to welcome you and closes to defend you; it is an 
architecture without doors and hallways,  where the next room is always 
where it needs to be and what it needs to be”.
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make of the entire globe, and of the human family, a 
single consciousness?” (McLuhan 1994: 61)
In a sense, Barlow's declaration is written from the point of view 
of  such  a  “single  consciousness”  of  cyberspace  explorers. 
McLuhan foresaw what  most  could not  see yet,  but  when the 
World Wide Web began to popularise the Internet in the 1990s 
many returned to read McLuhan, whose hitherto wild, probing 
and provocative assertions had originally passed many by or had 
simply  been  written  off  as  technological  determinism  or 
unsubstantiated  hype.  Barlow  in  a  sense  added  an  explicitly 
libertarian angle to McLuhan's thought.
Such are the origins of current visions in cyberspace. I turn now 
to  the  architecture  of  the  Internet  and  the  way  it  enables  a 
diversity of agency.
The World Wide Web is a technical layer that runs on top of the 
Internet. It is basically a protocol for data exchange, called the 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol,  which is why the addresses, so-
called  URLs  (Uniform  Resource  Locator)  or  URIs  (Uniform 
Resource  Identifier),  that  you  see  in  the  top  of  your  Internet 
browser,  most  often  commence  with  “http://”.  In  his  own 
account, "Weaving the Web: The Past, Present and Future of the 
World Wide Web by its Inventor”, Tim Berners-Lee writes about 
his  addition  to  the  Internet,  which  continues  to  network  the 
homes and consciousness of millions of people:
“The fundamental principle behind the Web was that 
once  someone  somewhere  made  available  a 
document, database, graphic, sound, video or screen 
at some stage in an interactive dialogue, it should be 
accessible  (subject  to  authorisation,  of  course)  by 
anyone, with any type of computer, in any country. 
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And it should be possible to make a reference – a 
link – to that thing, so that others could find it. This 
was a  philosophical  change  from the  approach of 
previous computer systems (Berners-Lee 1999: 40).
Before the Web, computers were largely separate storage spaces 
in the way that we think of a box in the attic. We know which 
box contains  what,  but  we do not  have a  virtual  box through 
which  all  our  things  can  be  accessed.  Today  it  is  almost 
impossible – unless you were there – to imagine computers that 
cannot be connected to the Web, which potentially connects them 
to all other computers in the world. This is a qualitative shift in 
information and communication technology that transcends the 
perceived passivity associated with television watching.
As  Lawrence  Lessig  the  famous  constitutionalist  and  Internet 
lawyer notes, the Internet and its additional layers, such as the 
Web, which he in sum refers to  as  Cyberspace,  supplemented 
“the  old  one-to-many  architectures  of  publishing  (television, 
radio, newspapers, books)” and thus created a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
architecture “where everyone could be a publisher” (Lessig 1999: 
4)10. Later he notes that this “end-to-end” (E2E) architecture of 
10 Lawrence  Lessig  is  also  the  founder  of  the  Creative  Commons 
(http://Creative Commons.org), which is a licensing platform that permits 
you to configure your own license for your culturally creative work and 
then release or publish that work in various media. You can pick and choose 
different sub-clauses and thus define the conditions under which you are 
freely sharing your work with other commoners and legally defending your 
work against  enclosure.  A very large amount  of  media  is  now available 
freely  online  and  the  concept  –  as  derived  from  Free  Software  –  is  
spreading  to  other  domains.  See  for  instance  the  associated  Science 
Commons, which “was launched with the goal of bringing the openness and 
sharing that have made Creative Commons licenses a success in the arts and 
cultural  fields  to  the  world  of  science”  available  at 
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the Internet  is  a “a stand-in for a commons” (2001: 89).  It  is 
because the underlying technical protocols of exchange are based 
on open standards and principles that the Internet is a commons. 
HTTP is not a closed protocol that you have to buy a license to 
use.
In  practice  people  began  to  create  websites  with  all  kinds  of 
information  –  from  pictures  of  their  pets  through  recipes  to 
poetry  and  prose  –  and  a  new  kind  of  information  culture 
emerged.  As  McLuhan  presciently  stated,  the  “process  of 
knowing will be collectively ... extended to the whole of human 
society” (McLuhan 1994: 3-4) and “it is [now] possible to store 
and to translate everything; and, as for speed, that is no problem. 
No further acceleration is possible this side of the light barrier” 
(McLuhan 1994: 58). The Internet and in particular the Web and 
Email layers have begun to circumscribe the “human family” and 
create  a  global  village  and  consciousness.  The  world  is 
networked – at least for those who can access it.
The architecture of the Internet, then, is open-ended and based on 
open  standards  and  principles  that  facilitate  exchange.  The 
network, as it were, is neutral (see Section 1.4.2). 
In the remaining part  of  the section I want to uncritically and 
briefly consider the “democratic” promise of the diverse agency 
that the Internet permits.
The  practices  that  perhaps  best  illustrate  the  foundation  for  a 
“single consciousness” operating at “the speed of light” resonant 
of McLuhan's vision and which promise to be more democratic 
http://sciencecommons.org/about/details/. Creative Commons is inspired by 
the  GNU  General  Public  License,  which  will  be  analysed  in  detail  in 
Section 3.5.
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than those offered by television and corporate news papers are 
found in the “blogosphere”. A “blog” is an abbreviation of Web 
Log, which is to say that it is a website where someone keeps a 
log of something. A blog can then be accessed, i.e. viewed, by 
anyone else with access to the web and be commented upon. The 
blogosphere is the space and sum of these actions, that is,  the 
shared space in which people are “blogging” and cooperating on 
critiques and analysis of each other's blogs and the mainstream 
media, as well as social, cultural and political events in general. 
It  is  a  space  that  has  grown phenomenally  fast,  there  “...  are 
already  over  30  million  blogs,  most  starting  in  the  past  two 
years” (Carlsson 2008: 208).
In the words of celebrated cyberspace analyst, Yochai Benkler, 
Co-Director of the Berkman  Center for Internet and Society at 
Harvard  Law  School,  the  blogosphere  is  a  space  in  which 
“filtering for both relevance and accreditation has become the 
object  of  widespread  practices  of  mutual  pointing,  of  peer 
review,  of  pointing  to  original  sources  of  claims,  and  its 
complement, the social practice that those who have some ability 
to evaluate the claims in fact  do comment on them” (Benkler 
2006: 12). A novel psycho-social realm, in a way, and a digital 
addition to the public sphere.
Blogging,  for  Benkler,  is  more  than  just  the  ability  for  each 
individual to become a digital pamphleteer: it makes possible a 
highly  complex  and  non-centrally  coordinated  “synthesis  of 
public  opinion”  through a  “synthesis  of  clusters  of  individual 
opinion  that  are  sufficiently  close  and  articulated  to  form 
something more than private opinions held by some number of 
individuals” (ibid: 184). Tagging with keywords of blog entries, 
sophisticated search engines and techniques have given rise to 
unprecedented  retrieval  speeds  of  related  information  from 
geographically  dispersed,  but  proximal  topics  and  themes, 
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leading to new social groupings that were previously too small 
too  thrive  in  their  respective  localities  as  a  subculture.  The 
blogosphere is a foundation for a critically engaged global civil 
society.
In cyberspace,  it  seems, ideas and knowledge spread like fire, 
like air,  and new frontiers of  the human mind are revealed in 
experimental social practices and co-production that promise a 
new way of life in a global village.
1.2.2 Social production.
In this section I explore the phenomenon of “social production” 
(Benkler 2006), which is a term developed as part of a project to 
understand  how  the  diverse  agency  that  has  emerged  in 
cyberspace can be made economically productive. I start with a 
familiar example.
Wikipedia is a freely accessible, Web based encyclopaedia that 
has  taken  many  by  surprise.  It  began  January  10,  2001.  By 
January 25 it counted 270 entries. By October 2001 more than 
17,000  entries  had  been  created  by  volunteers  in  cooperation 
without any leader. It has since then been growing very fast and 
now exists  in  more  than  250  languages.  In  the  main  English 
language  version  there  are  3.14  million  entries  (Wikipedia 
2010a),  cross-referenced  by  32.1  million  links,  and  with  an 
average  of  435  words  per  entry.  By  comparison  the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica has 65,000 entries with an average of 
650 words per entry (Wikipedia 2010b).
How did  it  happen?  Yochai  Benkler,  in  his  main  work  “The 
Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets 
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and Freedom” (2006), has provided a detailed analytical account 
of these and related processes, for which he has coined the term 
“social production”. For Benkler these novel processes indicate a 
new phase of the economy that is made possible by significantly 
declining  prices  of  computer  hardware  and  networking 
technologies.  The  continually  falling  prices  facilitate  social 
production – in part because excess capacity (discussed below) 
increases as material availability of the new technology increases 
– and he calls it the “networked information economy”:
“What  characterizes  the  networked  information 
economy is  that  decentralized  individual  action—
specifically,  new  and  important  cooperative  and 
coordinate  action  carried  out  through  radically 
distributed,  nonmarket  mechanisms  that  do  not 
depend  on  proprietary  strategies—plays  a  much 
greater  role  than  it  did,  or  could  have,  in  the 
industrial information economy” (ibid: 3).
In  the  networked  information  economy,  which  replaces  the 
“industrial  information  economy  that  typified  information 
production from about the second half of the nineteenth century 
and throughout the twentieth century” (ibid.), social production 
becomes possible. 
This  new mode of  social  production,  according to  Benkler,  is 
characterised  by  not unfolding  within  the  most  powerful  and 
important  existing  modalities  of  production,  defined  by  the 
institutions of the state, property, the firm and the market. Social 
production does not involve an employment contract, which is to 
say that it is a voluntary effort without monetary remuneration. 
Neither  is  social  production  organised  by  means  of  property, 
where property is understood as a legal arrangement that entitles 
someone to exclusive access to some thing and thus “constrains 
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actions” (ibid: 24). Instead, “what is special about our moment is 
the  rising  efficacy  of  individuals  and  loose,  nonmarket 
affiliations as agents of political economy” and  that “the market 
[and] the state will have to adjust to this new emerging modality 
of human action” (ibid: 16). Social production, in other words, is 
initially defined in terms of what it is not. Social production, we 
may say, unfolds as voluntary associations in global civil society, 
without private property incentives and beyond the state.
That was a brief overview of social production in general. I now 
go  into  details  about  how  Benkler  conceptualises  particular 
instances of social production.
In the networked information economy Benkler has identified a 
particular  mode  of  production,  which  exhibits  certain 
characteristics. These are: “radically decentralized, collaborative, 
and  nonproprietary;  based  on  sharing  resources  and  outputs 
among  widely  distributed,  loosely  connected  individuals  who 
cooperate  with  each  other  without  relying  on  either  market 
signals or managerial commands”(ibid: 60). This is a particular 
form of social production which he calls “commons-based peer 
production”  and  which  is  a  “socio-economic  system  of 
production  that  is  emerging  in  the  digitally  networked 
environment …[f]acilitated by the technical infrastructure of the 
Internet” (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006: 394). It  is  emerging 
through the  “collaboration  among large  groups  of  individuals, 
sometimes in the order of tens or even hundreds of thousands, 
who cooperate effectively to provide information, knowledge or 
cultural  goods  without  relying  on  either  market  pricing  or 
managerial  hierarchies  to  coordinate  their  common enterprise” 
(ibid.).
The term commons-based peer production can be broken down 
into  its  constituent  parts.  ““Commons”  refers  to  a  particular 
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institutional  form of  structuring  the  rights  to  access,  use,  and 
control  resources”,  which  for  Benkler  means  that  it  is  the 
opposite  of  “property”,  because  property  “determines  one 
particular  person  who  has  the  authority  to  decide  how  the 
resource will be used. That person may sell it, or give it away, 
more or less as he or she pleases” (ibid.). In commons, on the 
other hand, “no single person has exclusive control over the use 
and disposition of any particular resource in the commons” (ibid: 
61). Anyone within some more or less defined group has access 
to the resources of a given commons,  according to “rules that  
may  range  from  “anything  goes”  to  quite  crisply  articulated 
formal rules that are effectively enforced” (ibid.).
For  Lessig,  the  term  commons  refers  to  “a  resource  for 
decentralized  innovation”,  which  “create  the  opportunity  for 
individuals  to  draw  upon  resources  without  connections, 
permission  or  access  granted by others”,  which is  to  say that 
commons “are environments that commit to being open” (2001: 
85),  according  to  which  “the  Internet  forms  an  innovation 
commons...  protected  by  an  architecture  that  forbade 
discrimination” (ibid: 23). In this sense, commons do not have a 
singular, clear definition, but share a family resemblance – we 
know one when we see one – in that they are to some degree 
open and free, exhibiting commonalty in a way that life within 
firms and the market do not.
Commons-based for Benkler's purposes, more precisely, denotes 
a  mode  of  production  that  is  not based  on  the  “asymmetric 
exclusion typical of property” (Benkler 2006: 62), while “peer 
production” is a particular kind of commons-based production, in 
the way that  “commons-based” is  a category within the wider 
concept  of  social  production.  Peer  production  obtains  “when 
individual action … is self-selected and decentralized, rather than 
hierarchically  assigned”  (ibid.).  In  other  words,  Benkler 
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understands “social production” as an umbrella term for various 
new modes of  production that  are “commons-based”,  some of 
which, in turn, can be further identified as “peer production”.
That was a brief explanation of commons-based peer production 
in general.  The most  famous example of commons-based peer 
production is Free Software, which has:
“... played a critical role in the recognition of peer 
production,  because software is  a  functional  good 
with  measurable  qualities.  It  can  be  more  or  less 
authoritatively  tested  against  its  market-based 
competitors. And, in many instances, free software 
has prevailed” (Benkler 2006: 64).
The foundation of much of the Internet, the World Wide Web and 
the  blogosphere  is  Free  Software.  More  than  half  of  the  web 
servers on the Internet run on Free Software for instance, as do 
Google's  numerous  and  huge  server  farms  and,  of  course, 
Wikipedia (Netcraft 2009a).
We saw above how Benkler makes sense of social production. I 
now consider the framework from within which he operates, the 
discipline  and  language,  thus  the  mindset,  with  which  he 
approaches the task of making sense of such phenomena as Free 
Software.  I  aim  to  show  Benkler's  contribution  to  his  own 
discipline, economics.
The  motivation  for  Benkler's  work  is  to  explore  the  social 
dynamics inherent in these co-productive processes with a view 
to consolidating them, because they represent an economically 
interesting and novel mode of production: 
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“Commons-based  peer  production  presents  a 
fascinating phenomenon that could allow us to tap 
substantially  underutilized  reserves  of  human 
creative effort.  It  is  of  central  importance that  we 
not squelch peer production, but that we create the 
institutional  conditions  needed  for  it  to  flourish” 
(Benkler 2002: 446).
Benkler's  conception  of  social  production  takes  as  a  point  of 
departure  the  puzzle  that  the  phenomenon  of  commons-based 
peer production poses for elaborations of the theory of the firm 
that Ronald Coase presented in “The Nature of the Firm” (1937). 
Coase understood firms “as clusters of resources and agents that 
interact  through  managerial  command  systems  rather  than 
markets”  (Benkler  2002:  372).  Coase  argued  that  transaction 
costs in the organisation of production determine the emergence 
of firms and their limits. Transaction costs are the costs involved 
in trading in the market place. For instance, in order for me as an 
individual to bring a software programme to the market place for 
the main purpose of profiting economically, it will be useful to 
analyse  the  existing  market,  identify  competing  products  and 
their pricing, before actually producing the software. If I choose 
to produce and sell software I should also calculate what costs 
there might be in, say, hiring a lawyer to instigate litigation in 
case  my  customer  breaches  the  contract  of  sale.  Indeed,  on 
Coases's terms, to be economically sound, I should calculate all 
my transaction costs, which can be divided in categories, such as 
search  and  information  costs,  bargaining  and  decision  costs, 
policing and enforcement costs (Dahlman 1979). Next, I should 
also calculate what the costs of organising my production within 
a firm would be. A firm entails a managerial structure that might 
include price analysts and contract lawyers. On the basis of these 
calculations  of  costs  and  benefits,  I  should  choose  the  most 
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profitable  solution.  That  is,  I  should  balance  transaction  and 
organisation costs. Coase states that:
“Outside  the  firm,  price  movements  direct 
production, which is co-ordinated through a  series 
of  exchange  transactions  on  the  market.  Within  a 
firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in 
place  of  the  complicated  market  structure  with 
exchange transactions is substituted the entrepeneur-
co-ordinator, who directs production” (Coase 1937: 
388).
As Benkler accordingly summarises, people “use markets when 
the gains from doing so, net of transaction costs, exceed the gains 
from doing the same thing in a managed firm, net of organization 
costs.  Firms emerge when the opposite is  true.  Any individual 
firm will  stop growing when its  organization costs exceed the 
organization costs of a smaller firm” (Benkler 2002: 372).
On  the  basis  of  Coases's  work  a  more  elaborate  economics 
discourse  emerged  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  in  the  work  of 
institutional  economics,  which is  the  study of  the  relationship 
between markets and managerial hierarchies with reference to the 
organisation  of  production.  In  this  economistic  framework, 
which  is  part  of  the  theoretical  foundations  of  corporate 
management  thinking,  it  is  assumed  that  the  dynamics  of 
(economically significant) production can be explained in terms 
of the differences between the market and managerial hierarchies 
with reference to transaction and organisational costs. Commons-
based peer production does  not unfold directly within the “the 
market”, conceived of as a sphere where individual agents trade 
on the basis of private property rights and contract law. Nor does 
it rely on the hierarchical management systems of a firm where 
someone has the authority to tell someone else what to produce. 
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In  other  words,  Free  Software  hackers  “participate  in  free 
software projects without following the normal signals generated 
by market-based, firm-based, or hybrid models (ibid: 373).
In the analysis of the networked information economy, Benkler 
in  essence  assumes  a  liberal  understanding  of  individuals  as 
autonomous  and rational  beings,  but  he  does  not  assume that 
individuals are acting mainly out of self-interest in the way that 
neoliberal economists do. By way of a review of literature on the 
intersection of psychology and economics (Deci and Ryan 1985; 
Frey and Jegen 2001; Benabou and Tirole 2000) complemented 
by sociological narratives about social capital (Granovetter 1974; 
Lin 2001) brought into economics by Coleman (1988), Benkler 
makes  his   position  clear:  “...individuals  are  not  monolithic 
agents”:
“[In] any given culture, there will be some acts that 
a person would prefer to perform not for money, but 
for  social  standing,  recognition,  and  probably, 
ultimately, instrumental value obtainable only if that 
person has  performed the action through a social, 
rather  than  a  market,  transaction”  (Benkler  2006: 
96).
 “While it is possible to posit  idealized avaricious 
money-grubbers, altruistic saints, or social climbers, 
the reality of most people is a composite of these all, 
and one that is not like any of them. Clearly, some 
people  are  more  focused  on  making  money,  and 
others  are  more  generous;  some  more  driven  by 
social  standing  and  esteem,  others  by  a 
psychological sense of well-being” (Benkler 2006: 
98 ).
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The  theoretical  foundation  for  Benkler's  conception  of 
motivational factors of individuals is grounded in literature that 
draws upon “field and laboratory experiments, econometrics, and 
surveys”  (Benkler  2006:  94)  and  he  concludes  that  the  exact 
details are not important for his analysis. It is taken for granted 
that in addition to money as a motivational factor there is “some 
form  of  social  and  psychological  motivation  that  is  neither 
fungible with money nor simply cumulative with it” (ibid: 96) 
and  that  the  “relative  relationships  of  money  and  social-
psychological  rewards  are,  then,  dependent  on  culture  and 
context. Similar actions may have different meanings in different 
social or cultural contexts” (ibid: 97).
Combing the narratives of these sets of literature to form a basis 
for his own economic analysis of  social  production is  another 
contribution  to  economic  science.  It  makes  it  possible  to 
analytically  understand  motivational  factors  outside  of  the 
simplistic model of self-interest, which is not applicable in the 
context of social production. In that way economistic thinking is 
rejuvenated by its contemplation of social production, which in 
turn fuels the economy and fulfils expansionary needs:
“We need to assume no fundamental change in the 
nature of humanity; we need not declare the end of 
economics  as  we  know  it  ...  behaviors  and 
motivation  patterns  familiar  to  us  from  social 
relations generally continue to cohere in their own 
patterns.  What  has  changed  is  that  now  these 
patterns of behavior have become effective beyond 
the domains of building social  relations of mutual 
interest  and  fulfilling  our  emotional  and 
psychological needs of companionship and mutual 
recognition.  They have come to play a substantial 
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role  as  modes  of  motivating,  informing,  and 
organizing productive behavior at the very core of 
the information economy” (Benkler 2006: 91–2).
With  these  enhancements  to  the  economistic  framework,  the 
productive force of social production can better be harnessed by 
institutions  that  operate  on  such  logics.  Benkler  provides 
economics – which is the knowledge tool of privatisation – what 
it needs to be able to understand phenomena like Free Software 
in order to profit from them. Economics, in other words, needs to 
expand  its  vocabulary.  Benkler  has  chosen  –  or  is  obviously 
trained within – a  discipline that  is  known as  foundational  to 
private interests. Benkler’s analysis is a market and firm based 
analysis,  expressed  in  terms  that  are  familiar  to  corporate 
strategists.
We  have  seen  how  Benkler  conceptualises  social  production, 
particularly commons-based peer production and the disciplinary 
framework within which his conceptualisations unfold. Because 
commons-based  peer  production  does  not fit  the  standard 
economistic  model,  Benkler  understands  it  accordingly  as  a 
mode of production that does not rely upon the elements of that 
model, namely firms, the market and private property rights. His 
analysis is a major contribution to liberal economics in that he is 
pushing the boundaries of what  can be understood within that 
scientific discipline and hence begins to explore how firms can 
adapt their  managerial structures to “tap into” commons-based 
peer production as a new mode of production.
But what energy drives social production – where does the force 
come from that makes the wheels of social production turn? That 
is our next question.
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In Benkler's analysis the force of social production arises from 
“excess  capacity”,  which  is  central  to  the  notion  of  the 
productive potential of the “networked information economy”. A 
simple,  mundane example of freely sharing excess capacity in 
everyday settings is, for instance, if I possess some information 
about directions that a passer-by in the street enquires about and 
then give it to her without asking what she is going to give me in 
return.  I  simply  share  that  information  with  her.  Similarly,  I 
might  pick up a hitch-hiker,  because I  have extra space – i.e. 
excess capacity – in my car and I have the time needed to stop 
and ask where they are going. To engage in social production you 
need  some  skill  or  tool,  information  or  knowledge,  time  and 
willingness to share them without a direct promise of immediate, 
calculable return. Although these everyday practices – “boxes or 
books  moved  or  lifted,  instructions  given,  news  relayed,  and 
meals  prepared  by  family,  friends,  neighbors,  and  minimally 
decent strangers” (Benkler 2006: 119) – constitute a significant 
aspect of the global economy, we tend to ignore them (ibid.)11. 
However, in the context  of  information technology it  becomes 
easier to harness the forces of social production, pool them as a 
resource,  or  for  the  production  of  a  resource.  As  information 
11 It is worthy of note here that “excess capacity” is very similar to an element 
in the Aristotelian justification for private property rights that is commonly 
translated  as  magnanimity.  The  magnanimous  person  takes  pleasure  in 
sharing  excess  capacity  with  others.  Aristotle  noted  that  “there  is  the 
greatest  pleasure  in  doing  a  kindness  or  service  to  friends  or  guests  or 
companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property”. 
On that view, the excess capacity that drives social production, is capacity 
that arises once basic requirements for survival have been provided for – by 
means  of  private  property  rights  –  and  if  the  person  in  question  is  
magnanimous.  Indeed,  “democracy  itself  is  in  many  respects  a  socially 
produced resource relying on the leisure time of its citizens as an essential  
input” (Strahilevitz 2007: 1477).
71
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
technology  becomes  more  readily  and  widely  available,  the 
potential for social production to be transformed from mundane 
politeness and courtesy into a productive force to be reckoned 
with, increases:
“Because  of  changes  in  the  technology  of  the 
industrial  base  of  the  most  advanced  economies, 
social sharing and exchange is becoming a common 
modality  of  production  at  their  very  core—in the 
information,  culture,  education,  computation,  and 
communications sectors.  Free software,  distributed 
computing,  ad  hoc  mesh  wireless  networks,  and 
other forms of peer production offer clear examples 
of  large-scale,  measurably  effective  sharing 
practices” (ibid: 121).
The  reason  why  falling  prices  of  information  technology 
facilitate  an  increase  in  social  production  is  because  such 
technologies can be used to pool excess capacities - a little bit  
from here, a little bit from there - and thus establish and maintain 
resources that rival those of firms and markets.
“For … excess capacity to be harnessed and become 
effective,  the information production process must 
effectively integrate widely dispersed contributions, 
from many individual human beings and machines. 
These  contributions  are  diverse  in  their  quality, 
quantity, and focus, in their timing and geographic 
location. The great success of the Internet generally, 
and  peer-production  processes  in  particular,  has 
been  the  adoption  of  technical  and  organizational 
architectures that  have allowed them to pool  such 
diverse efforts  effectively.  The core characteristics 
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underlying the success of these enterprises are their 
modularity  and  their  capacity  to  integrate  many 
finegrained contributions” (Benkler 2006: 100).
Excess capacity, then, is the engine of social production; and it is 
a  capacity  that  is  in  great  part  reliant  on  and  emergent  from 
tangible resources. 
I  now  turn  to  the  promise  of  wealth  redistribution  and  the 
obstacles to its realisation. Giving directions to a fellow citizen is 
not very conducive to bridging the gap between the rich and the 
poor. However, the example of freely sharing excess capacity (of 
time and skills) by contributing to the creation, production and 
maintenance  of  professional  level  computer  software   - 
understood  as  an  important  means  of  production  in  an 
information society-  appears much more promising with regard 
to a redistribution of wealth. The potential for a redistribution of 
wealth  normatively  underpins  Benkler's  advocacy  of  social 
production as a new mode of production.
“If the networked information economy is indeed a 
significant  inflection  point  for  modern  societies 
along … it is so because it upsets the dominance of 
proprietary,  market-based production in the sphere 
of  the  production  of  knowledge,  information,  and 
culture. This upset is hardly uncontroversial. It will 
likely result  in significant redistribution of wealth, 
and  no  less  importantly,  power,  from  previously 
dominant firms and business models to a mixture of 
individuals and social groups on the one hand, and 
on  the  other  hand  businesses  that  reshape  their 
business  models  to  take  advantage  of,  and  build 
tools and platforms for, the newly productive social 
relations” (Benkler 2006: 468).
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Although  the  achievements  and  future  success  of  social 
production, for Benkler, is related to the simultaneous advance 
and continuously  decreasing  prices  of  information  technology, 
the  rise  and  success  of  social  production  should  not  be 
understood as “deterministically preordained” (ibid.).
However, we should take note of the fact that Benkler’s account 
does rely on the falling prices of hardware. This is to say that he  
clearly recognises that cheap materials for access to cyberspace 
are needed on a very large scale  in  order  for everyone in the 
world to be a radical blogger – and for the world government to 
be  a  real-time  cyberspace  debate  between  self-organised 
commoners.
“We  have  an  opportunity  to  change  the  way  we 
create  and  exchange  information,  knowledge,  and 
culture. By doing so, we can make the twenty-first 
century  one  that  offers  individuals  greater 
autonomy, political communities greater democracy, 
and societies greater opportunities for cultural self-
reflection  and human connection.  We can  remove 
some  of  the  transactional  barriers  to  material 
opportunity,  and  improve  the  state  of  human 
development  everywhere.  Perhaps  these  changes 
will  be  the  foundation  of  a  true  transformation 
toward  more  liberal  and  egalitarian  societies. 
Perhaps they will  merely improve, in well-defined 
but  smaller  ways,  human life  along each of  these 
dimensions.  That  alone  is  more  than  enough  to 
justify  an  embrace  of  the  networked  information 
economy  by  anyone  who  values  human  welfare, 
development, and freedom” (ibid: 473).
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These  are  great  promises.  But  if  we  unpack  the  dynamics  of 
hardware  production  in  terms  of  natural  resource  use  and the 
exploitation of labour,  as well  as the disposal  of  these always 
already  obsolete,  super-annuated  electronic  commodities  that 
must give way for the latest, cheapest, fastest new gadget, then 
these promises ring hollow: without environmental conscience or 
solidarity with labourers. Benkler's account of the potentials of 
the intangible realm, however, certainly exhibits a clear reliance 
upon the tangible realm and its materiality.
Those problems apart,  a major obstacle to realising the wealth 
distribution inherent in social production is the power of those 
whose interests it challenges. Needless to say, the emergence of 
commons-based peer production provokes reactions:
“In law, we see a continual tightening of the control 
that  the  owners  of  exclusive  rights  are  given. 
Copyrights are longer, apply to more uses, and are 
interpreted as reaching into every corner of valuable 
use. Trademarks are stronger and more aggressive. 
Patents  have  expanded  to  new  domains  and  are 
given greater leeway. All these changes are skewing 
the institutional ecology in favor of business models 
and production practices that are based on exclusive 
proprietary claims; they are lobbied for by firms that 
collect  large  rents  if  these  laws  are  expanded, 
followed, and enforced” (ibid: 469-470).
The political  tensions described here have been the subject  of 
much debate over the last few decades (see Section 1.3). In the 
way  that  Benkler  presents  social  production,  particularly 
commons-based  peer  production,  it  is  clear  that  these  novel 
social  relations pose a threat  to  those who seek rent  in  ideas, 
information and knowledge. While, vice versa, the regimes of so-
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called intellectual property rights pose a threat to the continued 
success of commons-based peer production and any other form 
of social production on a larger scale. These are conflicts over 
the  shape  of  the  “institutional  ecology”12 of  the  networked 
information economy. Benkler, it seems, finds a middle-ground 
on  which  the  commons  need  not  fear  destruction  on  the  one 
hand, while private interest can continue to reap profits, on the 
other.
There  is  another,  related  conflict  arising  from  these 
circumstances, which has to do with the technical layer of social 
production,  namely  the  underlying,  material  network,  i.e.  the 
Internet with all its cables and switches and satellites. In the same 
way as the widespread availability of computers is required for 
hackers  to  be  able  to  be  productive,  a  technostructural  
underpinning is also required for individual labour inputs – i.e. 
12 Benkler uses the institutional ecology metaphor to emphasise  “the actual 
organization of human affairs and legal systems is not converging through a 
process of either Marxist determinism or its neoclassical economics mirror 
image, “the most efficient institutions win out in the end”” (Benkler 2006: 
387); rather the laws and institutions that govern, directly or indirectly, the 
cultural  environment  are  sites  of  conflict  between  parties  with  often 
oppositional interests. In each local and single-issue conflict certain paths 
will be chosen and it might be difficult to determine who is winning locally 
and who is leading globally: “[t]he term “institutional ecology” refers to 
this context-dependent, causally complex, feedback-ridden, path-dependent 
process” (ibid.), which “includes regulatory and policy elements that affect 
different industries, draw on various legal doctrines and traditions, and rely 
on diverse economic and political theories and practices. It includes social  
norms of sharing and consumption of things conceived of as quite different
—bandwidth,  computers,  and  entertainment  materials”  (ibid:  392). 
“Critically, the institutional ecology … can be understood as a system of  
institutions that interacts and co-evolves with the other important behavior-
affecting (regulating) systems, including technology, social practices, and 
markets”. (Frischmann 2007: 1131)
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fragments of excess capacity - to become successfully aggregated 
into an economically significant resource. Hence,
“[w]e  are  seeing  significant  battles  over  the 
organization  and legal  capabilities  of  the  physical 
components of the digitally networked environment. 
Will  all  broadband  infrastructures  be  privately 
owned? If  so,  how wide a  margin of  control  will 
owners have to prefer some messages over others?” 
(bid: 469).
Approaches to these conflicts will be critically discussed in the 
following two sections. It is obvious that those two battle fronts – 
with intellectual property law and network owners – are crucial 
for the future of commons-based peer production. That is to say 
that a realisation of the great potential that Benkler sees in the 
novel  social  and  co-productive  relations  that  are  facilitated  in 
“the networked information economy” will in great part depend 
on the outcome of those battles, and the framing of these issues is 
an integral part of the battle tactics, as we shall see. 
In the next section I consider the philosophy and politics of what 
I  call  “information  exceptionalism”,  which  is  an  approach  to 
defending  social  production  and  the  Internet  commons  from 
privatisation.  It  turns  an  a  conception  of  property  that  is 
problematic and which I will problematise and seek to subvert.
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1.3 Information  exceptionalism:  protecting  the  Internet   
commons?
“Notions  of  property,  value,  ownership,  and  the 
nature  of  wealth  itself  are  changing  more 
fundamentally than at any time since the Sumerians 
first  poked  cuneiform into  wet  clay  and  called  it 
stored grain. Only a very few people are aware of 
the  enormity  of  this  shift,  and  fewer  of  them are 
lawyers or public officials. Those who do see these 
changes  must  prepare  responses  for  the  legal  and 
social confusion that will erupt as efforts to protect 
new forms  of  property  with  old  methods  become 
more obviously futile, and, as a consequence, more 
adamant.” (Barlow in Groves 1997: 25-26)
1.3.1 Ideas should not be owned.
In this section I look at the politics of intellectual property. First  
in  general  terms  and  then  from  the  perspective  of  cultural 
environmentalism or Free Culture.
As  already  suggested  in  the  previous  section  the  success  of 
commons-based  peer  production  and  the  growth  potential  for 
social  production  in  general  is  subject  to  the  outcome  –  or 
unfolding – of a battle with those corporate forces that have a 
business model based on intellectual property rights. It is in large 
part  a  battle  in  the  public  policy  arena  for  which  Benkler's 
analysis – which proceeds from the same economistic framework 
– is well suited. His arguments for reform of what he calls the 
“institutional  ecology”,  based  on  the  promises  of  social 
production,  as  we  have  seen,  are  very  strong.  However,  the 
enemy  is  at  least  as  strong.  Barlow  explains  in  colourful 
language and with reference to “armies”:
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“[S]ince it is ... now possible to create useful tools 
that  never  take  physical  form,  we  have  taken  to 
patenting abstractions, sequences of virtual events, 
and mathematical formulae - the most unreal estate 
imaginable.  In  certain  areas,  this  leaves  rights  of 
ownership  in  such  an  ambiguous  condition  that 
property again adheres to those who can muster the 
largest armies. The only difference is that this time 
the  armies  consist  of  lawyers  ...  What  was 
previously considered a  common human resource, 
distributed  among  the  minds  and  libraries  of  the 
world, as well as the phenomena of nature herself, is 
now being fenced and deeded. It is as though a new 
class of enterprise had arisen that  claimed to own 
the air.” (Barlow 1994).
In  this  field  of  tension  we can  speak  of  an  intensification  of 
intellectual property protection on a global scale (May 2010)13. 
The scope and level of protection in intellectual property law has 
dramatically increased over recent  decades. Protectable subject 
13 Intellectual  property  law  must  be  divided  into  several  distinct  areas. 
Copyright law protects “original forms of expression” - ‘Tambourine Man’, 
‘Star  Wars’,  ‘1984’.  Patent  law  protects  inventions  -  snowboards, 
microchips, genetically engineered rice. Trademark law protects words and 
symbols that identify goods and services - ‘Coca-Cola’, the Mercedes-Benz 
star.  Trade-secret  law protects  information that  a company has tried but  
failed  to  conceal  from  competitors  -  secret  formulas  for  soft  drinks,  
confidential marketing strategies. Plant breeders’ rights protect new plant 
varieties.  Of  these,  copyrights,  patents,  and  trademarks are  arguably the 
most economically significant. There are other, more obscure rights that fall 
under the intellectual property category: e.g. the rights to layout designs of 
integrated circuits,  or  the “right  of  publicity” which protects  celebrities’ 
presumed interests in their  images and identities.
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matter  is  being widened, protection terms are being expanded, 
new rights are being created, the ease with which protections are 
granted is growing, and intellectual property standards are being 
harmonized  throughout  the  world  (Fisher  III  1999).  While 
intellectual property rights have never been more economically 
and politically significant than they are in the current so-called 
‘knowledge  economy’,  they  have  also  never  been  more 
controversial (Dutfield 2003). Information and knowledge today 
are crucial market commodities, and are priced accordingly. In 
this  way,  the  benefits  of  the  ‘knowledge  economy’  or 
‘information society’ flow “to those who own the information 
and  knowledge  resources  which  have  been  rendered  as 
intellectual  property  rather  than  those  whose  need  for  such 
information and/or knowledge might be greatest” (May 2000: 1).
James Boyle (1996), whose work I return to below, argues that 
there  are  structural  tendencies  in  our  patterns  of  thinking  and 
discourse  about  intellectual  property  that  lead  to  ‘over’ rather 
than ‘under-protection’ of such property. He thinks that there are 
two  theories,  or  discourses  of  information  –  the  “public 
goods/incentives  theory”  and  the  “anti-monopoly/free  flow  of 
information theory” – which conflict over the issue of intellectual 
property:
“The economic analysis of information is beset by 
internal  contradiction  and uncertainty;  information 
is  both  a  component  of  the  perfect  market  and  a 
good  that  must  be  produced  within  that  market. 
Under  the  former  characterisation,  information  is 
supposed to  move towards perfection – a state  in 
which it  is  costless,  instantly available and so on. 
Under the latter characterisation, information must 
be  commodified  so  as  to  give  its  producers  an 
incentive to produce. But each property right handed 
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out  to  ensure  the  production  of  information  is  a 
transaction cost when seen from the perspective of 
market efficiency” (Boyle 1997: 95-96.).
The last decades have seen the expansion of copyright and patent 
legislation  to  cover  software,  the  patenting  of  life-forms  and 
human genes, and the extension of copyright term limits. With 
the advent of the Internet, and the digital possibilities it affords, 
private  enterprise  has,  somewhat  unsurprisingly,  almost 
exclusively  pressed  for  the  commodification  of  information. 
These pressures are difficult to avert, expressing as they do some 
of the most powerful interests on the global politico-economical 
stage. Intellectual property rights are predominantly justified in 
terms of their ability to produce present and future public benefit 
–  whichever  way  the  latter  is  defined  on  any  particular 
justificatory account.14
But it is important to remember that intellectual property rights 
are  “limited  monopolies”  (Boyle  1997:  105;  emphasis  added), 
and it  is their limitations that are at  least as important  for the 
generation of public benefit as is the grant of the right itself. In 
Boyle’s words: “since there is no ‘natural’ absolute intellectual 
property right,  the doctrines which  favor consumers  and other 
users, such as fair use, are just as much a part of the basic right as 
the entitlement of the author to prevent certain kinds of copying” 
(ibid.:  105). The rhetoric and vision of the ‘original author’ or 
‘lone  inventor’ that  pervades  the  current  intellectual  property 
discourses not  only downplays the importance of fair  use and 
thus  encourages  an  absolutist  rather  than  a  functional  idea  of 
14 Fisher  (2001)  identifies  four  main  perspectives  that  currently  dominate 
theoretical  writing  about  intellectual  property:  Utilitarianism;  Lockean 
Labour Theory; Hegelian Personality Theory; and the more recent,  legal 
realist Social Planning Theory.
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intellectual property, but also devalues the importance of the ‘raw 
materials’ (previous inventions  and articulations) out  of  which 
new works are  forged.  In  doing  so,  the  prevailing intellectual 
property regime, with all its emphasis on innovation, undermines 
the  situation in  which the materials  for  innovation are  readily 
available:
“The structure of our property rights discourse tends 
to undervalue the public domain, by failing to make 
actors and society as a whole internalize the losses 
caused by the extension and exercise of intellectual 
property rights. The fundamental aporia in economic 
analysis of information issues, the source-blindness 
of an ‘original author’ centered model of property 
rights, and the political blindness to the importance 
of the public domain as a whole ... all come together 
to  make  the  public  domain  disappear,  first  in 
concept  and  then,  increasingly,  in  reality”  (ibid.: 
111-112.).
Boyle  calls  for  an  analytically  and  rhetorically  sophisticated 
political economy of intellectual property, for “the fundamental 
property  regime  of  the  information  economy”  not  to  be 
constructed behind our backs (ibid.: 116).
We return to Boyle's approach to the described problems below. 
First,  let  me  briefly  consider  the  nature  of  those  problems as 
presented in economistic terms. This concerns the construction of 
scarcity.
Information – knowledge, ideas – can usually be shared between 
people at little cost. In the most basic example, I can pick up a 
scrap of paper in the bin and write down my favourite recipe or 
poem and give it  to you. In turn, you can equally easily copy 
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either of these and pass them on. Alternatively, we can circulate 
them by word of mouth. This, however, creates a problem on the 
liberal  economic  account.  As  the  famous  economist  Kenneth 
Arrow,  whose  work  on  intellectual  property  has  been  very 
influential since the 1950s, writes:
“If  information  is  not  property,  the  incentives  to 
create it will be lacking. Patents and copyrights are 
social  innovations  designed  to  create  artificial 
scarcities  where  none  exist  naturally  …  These 
scarcities  are  intended  to  create  the  needed 
incentives for acquiring information” (1996: 125).
We can thus identify the contradiction that Boyle took note of 
above in  Arrow's  economic statement,  which causes  increased 
tension in policy debates as the discourse about social production 
gains traction.
"The  contradiction  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  the 
political economy of intellectual property is between 
the  low  to  non-existent  marginal  cost  of 
reproduction  of  knowledge  and  its  treatment  as 
scarce property" (May 2000: 43)
However, as Benkler and Boyle argue, artificial scarcity is  not 
necessary  for  economically  significant  production  of 
informational  goods  to  happen.  If  it  were,  Free  Software, 
Wikipedia and the blogosphere would not exist. 
To paraphrase Barlow, then, novel social relations with regard to 
things are being forced into old moulds that stifle their unfolding 
and thus pose an obstacle to freedom of information and speech 
and  by  extension  to  democracy  as  such.  Property  concepts 
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derived  from  the  industrial  revolution  –   that  themselves  are 
artificial – and which were created for very different purposes, 
have detrimental effects in an economy where the possibilities 
for the free flow of information, knowledge and ideas – due to 
sophisticated information technology – are enormous. As Barlow 
writes:
“Physical  objects  have  a  completely  different 
natural economy than intellectual goods. It's a tricky 
thing to try to own something that remains in your 
possession even after you give it to many others”. 
(Barlow in Doherty 2004).
Here echoed in general terms by Lessig:
“While  some resources  must  be controlled,  others 
can be provided much more freely. The difference is 
in the nature of the resource,  and therefore in the 
nature  of  how  the  resource  is  supplied”  (Lessig 
2001: 94)
These are the foundations of the analyses of Barlow, Benkler, 
Boyle, Lessig and others who have followed their lead and joined 
the  movement  of  “cultural  environmentalism”,  which  I  will 
present briefly below.
The idea of cultural environmentalism developed as a call for a 
social  and political  movement for  the protection of  the public 
domain. Boyle gave birth to the idea in his “Shamans, Software 
&  Spleens:  Law  and  the  Construction  of  the  Information 
Society” (1996), drawing upon lessons learned from the social 
and political movement(s) generally known as the environmental 
movement. 
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“Metaphors  and  analogies  do  not  make  things 
happen by themselves. In the vast majority of cases, 
the environmental analogy merely provided an easy 
label  to  something  that  was  happening  anyway. 
Nevertheless, I think there are productive semantic, 
theoretical,  economic,  constituency-building,  and 
organizational insights to be had in thinking about a 
cultural  and  scientific  environmentalism  ”  (Boyle 
2007: 19)
It was a bold idea, but well founded. Boyle began in 1997 with a 
cautious and qualificatory remark with regards to his analogy, yet 
emphasizing  that  what  issues  from  conflicts  in  the  cultural 
environment  might  indeed  have  substantial  impact  on  human 
lives:
“For some, the difference in seriousness of the two 
problems  robs  the  analogy  of  its  force.  After  all, 
environmental problems could actually destroy the 
biosphere and this is just, well, intellectual property. 
My response to this is partly that this is an analogy. I 
am comparing the form of the problems rather than 
their seriousness. Still, I have to say I believe that 
part of this reaction has to do with a failure to adjust 
to the importance that intellectual property has and 
is  going  to  have in  an information society.  Again 
and again, one meets a belief that this is a technical 
issue  with  no  serious  human,  political  or 
distributional consequences.” (Boyle 1997: 115) 
The environmental movement invented the “environment” as a 
semiotic category and gave a common cause to hunters, fishers, 
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birdwatchers and consumers who could then unite as activists to 
save  “the  environment”15 (Boyle  2003).  By  semiotic  is  meant 
merely the textbook definition of that term, namely a sign (which 
in this case is a word) in which a wider collective invests the 
same meaning; that meaning is whatever would bring together a 
bioregionalist  in  Lancashire  with  an  indigenous  community 
activist in the Amazon in a common discourse about (protecting) 
“the environment”. While the former might speak of unfair wage 
relations and environmental  costs in connection with imported 
fruit,  the  latter  might  speak  of  disrespectful  behaviour  toward 
Mother Earth, but they can come together within the idea of “the 
environment”  and  share  strategies  and  tactics  to  end  the 
respective injustices that they perceive are occurring in what are 
no longer disparate areas of life and the planet,  but which are 
globally shared (environmental) concerns.
From  the  Silent  Spring  via  the  Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  recent 
Climate  Summit  in  Bali  and  the  UN  Climate  Summit  in 
Copenhagen  2009  “the  (natural)  environment”  has  become  a 
household  term  and  the  focus  of  concerned  citizens  taking 
collective action, forming voluntary associations in civil society 
and beyond.
“[F]ollowing  Rachel  Carson’s  1962  exposé  Silent 
Spring  to  the  early  1970s’ movements  that  led  to 
federal legislation like the Clean Air Act, the Clean 
Water  Act,  and  the  Endangered  Species  Act, 
thousands  of  non-experts  have  forced  hidden 
technological  decisions  into  the  public  eye.  An 
interesting example of ongoing grassroots,  citizen-
15 The “natural  environment”,  it  is  perhaps pertinent  to  note,  is  in  itself  a  
socio-cultural (semiotic) construction rather than something to be regarded 
as an antonym to nurture or “the social”.
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based science activism is the Volunteer Monitor and 
its  hundreds  of  local  groups  carrying  out  water-
quality monitoring with homemade devices, simple 
observations,  and  open  record  keeping  (Carlsson 
2008: 31).
Boyle  wanted  to  see  the  same  thing  happen  for  the  cultural 
environment,  so  that,  say,  poets,  hackers,  bloggers,  musicians, 
scholars  and  journalists  can  unite  under  the  collective  banner 
“cultural  environmentalism”  to  save  the  public  domain  and 
ensure  that  future  generations  have  access  to  a  free  flowing 
culture  of  information,  knowledge  and  ideas.  Cultural 
environmentalism,  we  could  say,  is  a  movement  for  the 
facilitation  of  creative  unfolding  unfettered  by  exclusive 
ownership arrangements. 
“Cultural  environmentalism  is  an  idea,  an 
intellectual and practical movement, that is intended 
to be a solution to a set of political and theoretical 
problems—an  imbalance  in  the  way  we  make 
intellectual property policy, a legal regime that has 
adapted poorly to the transformation that technology 
has produced in the scope of law, and, perhaps most 
importantly,  a  set  of  mental  models,  economic 
nostrums,  and  property  theories  that  each  have  a 
public domain-shaped hole at  their  center” (Boyle 
2006).
The aim of cultural environmentalism can be summed in the title 
of Lessig's “Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and 
the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity” (2004), 
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while  the  subtitle  sums  up  the  analyses  of  cultural 
environmentalism16.
Relatedly,  it  has  been  clearly  acknowledged  that  cultural 
environmentalism and the Free Culture movement stand on the 
shoulders of the giant Free Software movement, which is a key 
reason for the pertinence of their debates to this essay. The most 
successful  and  the  original  example  of  Free  Culture  in 
cyberspace is Free Software:
“The inspiration for the  title  and for  much of  the 
argument  of  this  book  comes  from  the  work  of 
Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. 
Indeed, as I reread Stallman’s own work, especially 
the essays in Free Software, Free Society, I realize 
that all of the theoretical insights I develop here are 
insights Stallman described decades ago. One could 
thus  well  argue  that  this  work  is  “merely” 
derivative” (ibid: xv).
More than a decade has passed since Boyle's seminal work and a 
lot has happened in both theory and practice. The environmental 
analogy  has  been  further  developed  and  the  idea  of  cultural 
environmentalism is by now widely used in scholarly circles. A 
special issue of 'Law and Contemporary Problems' was published 
in spring 2007 with Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle as editors 
to  celebrate  more  than  ten  years  of  developing  the  ideas  that 
Boyle  originally  framed  within  his  notion  of  a  cultural 
16 I use “cultural  environmentalism” and Free Culture  interchangeably,  but 
will  tend  to  the  latter  hereinafter,  due  to  its  close  connection  to  Free 
Software. While there are subtle differences between either of these terms 
and what  they refer  to,  all  three movements  or  factions do have shared 
views on property, as we shall see.
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environment through which he inspired a new “environmental” 
movement for a free cultural realm17.
The work of Benkler has seen a move “beyond a fascination with 
the  second enclosure  movement  and the assault  on the public 
domain”  (Boyle  2007:  21)  to  begin  establishing  an  analytical 
framework for understanding social production. In other words 
the building of alternatives. Benkler has charted the territory of 
the (cultural) environment that circumscribes the possibilities for 
human creativity  and  he  has  revealed  basic  points  of  conflict 
within  that  institutional  ecology.  As  Frischmann  writes,  “[h]e 
views the “new enclosure  movement”  in  terms of  attempts  to 
shape and control systems of laws and institutions that structure 
our  relationships  with  the  cultural  environment  and  affect 
behavior  within  the  environment.  Thus,  while  intellectual 
property  laws  remain  an  integral  front  in  the  battle, 
telecommunication  law  and  regulation,  domain  name 
governance, trespass to chattels, and other laws and institutions 
are also subject to conflict” (ibid.).  The cultural environmentalist 
movement is thus no longer merely providing analyses of how 
the cultural  environment is being destroyed through enclosure, 
but has begun to provide both descriptive and analytical accounts 
of the alternative modes of co-production that are emerging in 
cyberspace, as we saw in the preceding section.
This was a brief overview of Free Culture politics with regard to 
intellectual property. We saw how they frame the debate in basic 
terms,  which  sets  the  intangible  realm  –  ideas,  knowledge, 
information  –  apart  from  the  tangible  realm.  Due  to  the 
difference  in  what  we  might  call  metaphysical  terms,  Free 
Culture advocates argue for a treatment of informational goods 
17 The special issue is the best introduction to cultural environmentalism (See 
Boyle and Lessig 2007).
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that does not involve “property”, which is seen as an outdated, 
industrial mode of organisation that is unfit for information and 
ideas. In this account, the material foundations of cyberspace are 
obscured, but they come to the fore, only framed differently, in 
the relation between Free Culture and the state.
Social production, as Benkler constructs it, requires the state for 
regulatory intervention due to the threat that the owners of the 
material  underpinning  of  cyberspace  represent  and  for  the 
purposes of education, infrastructure and so on (I go into detail in 
Section 1.4).
In Benkler's discussion of social production, which is “rooted in 
a theoretical skepticism about the state” (Benkler 2006: 21), “the 
state plays no role, or is perceived as playing a primarily negative 
role” (Benkler 2006: 16). However, Benkler does not dismiss the 
state entirely. On the contrary, as part of a “practical diagnosis of 
opportunities,  barriers,  and  strategies  for  achieving 
improvements  in  human  freedom  and  development  given  the 
actual conditions of technology, economy, and politics” (Benkler 
2006: 21), the state is embraced as an appropriate institution for 
securing “funding of neutral broadband networks, ... funding of 
basic research, and possible strategic regulatory interventions to 
negate monopoly control over essential resources in the digital 
environment” (ibid.). 
In order to safeguard these new and productive social forces of 
cyberspace from enclosure, cultural environmentalists appeal to 
the state. The freedom of Free Culture is hence dependent on the 
state  despite  Benkler's  “state  skepticism”.  On  the  one  hand, 
social  production  is  well  defined  and  unfolds  with  minimal 
reference  to  the  state  –  of  which  many  social  producers  are 
themselves  sceptical  –  while  on the other  hand,  it  is  crucially 
dependent on the state to intervene and regulate the institutional 
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ecology  in  such  a  way  as  to  facilitate  the  growth  of  social 
production, as we shall see in Section 1.4.
Benkler  does  not  object  object  “in  principle  to  an  effective, 
liberal  state  pursuing  one  of  a  range  of  liberal  projects  and 
commitments”,  but  rather  suggests  that  “the  state  could play 
constructive roles, if it stopped listening to incumbents for long 
enough to realize this” (2006: 21; emphasis added).
If the state would listen to Free Culture advocates, rather than 
corporate  agents,  it  could play constructive roles.  Yet  Benkler 
recognises that the state is not necessarily the best provider of 
freedom  and  autonomy:  “there  is  more  freedom  to  be  found 
through opening up institutional spaces for voluntary individual 
and cooperative action than there is in intentional public action 
through the state” (ibid.). The most important role that the state 
could play with regard to social production is to ensure that its 
technostructural underpinning remains freely accessible, which is 
a crucial role with regard to the concept of “network neutrality” 
(see  Section  1.4.2  below).  Moreover,  in  the  “networked 
information economy” envisioned by Benkler, the state appears 
to play a more active, engaged role – in a positive understanding 
of  engagement  –  than  it  has  done  in  the  neoliberal  era  of 
globalisation  from  above.  In  other  words,  a  relatively 
strengthened state.  The relationship  with the  state  is  therefore 
rather ambiguous:
“I offer no particular reasons to resist many of the 
roles traditionally played by the liberal state. I offer 
no  reason  to  think  that,  for  example,  education 
should stop being primarily  a state-funded,  public 
activity and a core responsibility of the liberal state, 
or that public health should not be so. I have every 
reason to think that the rise of nonmarket production 
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enhances, rather than decreases, the justifiability of 
state funding for basic science and research, as the 
spillover  effects  of  publicly  funded  information 
production  can  now  be  much  greater  and  more 
effectively  disseminated  and  used  to  enhance  the 
general welfare” (ibid: 22).
In the next section I will briefly outline the shared tactics of the 
Free  Software  and  Free  Culture  movements  that  define  their 
strategy  to  foster  an  institutional  ecology  of  freedom  and 
autonomy. 
Our discussion will soon show that regulatory intervention by the 
state –  in the absence of a revolutionary reform of the property  
relations that govern the technostructural underpinning of social  
production – is absolutely crucial for Free Culture in the struggle 
against privatising forces.
1.3.2 Property and the tangible/intangible divide: a policy of 
what?
In  this  section  I  examine  the  reasoning  behind  the  particular 
framing  of  the  intangible  realm  that  characterise  information 
exceptionalism. 
Siva  Vaidhyanathan,  prominent  cultural  environmentalist  and 
professor of Media Studies and Law at the University of Virginia, 
writes that “[i]t is essential to understand that copyright in the 
American tradition was not meant to be a “property right” as the 
public  generally  understands  property”  (2001:  11)  and 
“[c]opyright should be about policy, not property” (ibid: 15) and 
“[c]opyright  is  not  property  as  commonly  understood.  It  is  a 
specific  state-granted  monopoly  issued  for  particular  policy 
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reasons”  (ibid:  253).  Moreover  “[c]opyright  was  a  matter  of 
policy, of a bargain among the state, its authors, and its citizens” 
(ibid:  23)  and “Jefferson  even explicitly  dismissed  a  property 
model for copyright” (ibid.).
That copyright is a matter of policy, not property might sound 
strange  to  a  lawyer  or  a  philosopher  trained  to  understand 
copyright  as  a  particular  instance of  property relations  with  a 
temporal  limit  and  who  understands  property  as  a  matter  of 
policy.  Some  things  do  not  quite  add  up.  Nevertheless,  that 
copyright is a matter of policy, not property, is a point that the 
founder  of  the  Free  Software  Foundation,  Richard  Stallman, 
together  with  other  advocates  of  “Free  Culture”,  wants  us  to 
accept18.
Essentially, the Free Software and Free Culture movements reject 
the  concept  of  property  and  instead  choose  to  frame  issues 
pertaining  to  ideas,  information  and  knowledge  -  or  the 
intangible  realm -  in  terms  of  freedom,  liberty,  human rights, 
policy, intervention, and regulation. Anything but property, but 
preferably “policy”.
Two  mediate  questions  arise  from  this  position:  (i)  What  is 
policy? (ii) Why should we choose to adopt one term instead of 
another? I will answer them in turn.
18 The presentation of the Free Software Foundation's position on copyright as 
policy, not property that follows  is  in great part an outcome of an extended 
email exchange with Richard Stallman. In order to understand FSF's view 
on these matters  I  commenced the exchange and sent,  so far,  44 emails 
between May 12, 2007 and January 30, 2008. Stallman responded with 58 
emails between May 13, 2007 and January 18, 2008. In the original thesis 
manuscript I sincerely thanked Richard Stallman in the acknowledgements 
for taking his time to engage in this exchange. I do so here again.
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What  is  policy?  Is  there  something  in  the  word  that  clearly 
delimits it from property? What does policy actually mean and 
where does the term come from? It is term that is etymologically 
compounded by two roots.  The Greek “polis” - πόλις – which 
means  “city”  or  “state”  and  also  “citizenship”  or  a  “body  of 
citizens”.  In  other  words,  a  rather  general  term suggestive  of 
“political society” and those “who make up that society”, either 
individually or collectively,  or  their  status within that  political 
society. The second root of policy is the Latin “politus”, which 
means  “polished”  in  the  sense  of  “refined”.  In  late  Middle 
English  the  compounded  “policy”  ambiguously  referred  to 
“political  sagacity”  and “political  cunning”,  the  former 
presumably  the  meaning it  had  for  those  in  power,  while  the 
latter  likely reflects the views of common people.  Despite the 
ambiguity, or perhaps exactly because of this ambiguity, policy 
referred  to  “what  those  in  power  are  doing,  how  they  rule 
society”.  The  modern  term  policy,  then,  enters  the  English 
language conveying the meaning of  “a  constitution”,  which is 
now rare or obscure, but in 18th century political science referred 
to “government, administration”; or was equated with “polity”, 
which in turn meant  “civil  order”,  “administration of a state”, 
“civil  government”  or  “a  particular  form  of  political 
organization” (OED 1955: 1536-1537)19. In other words, policy 
is a broad term that we may say refers to a variety of activities 
that a state performs as part of the governance of its people.
In the context of capitalist democracy, therefore, the conventions 
that institute its particular form of private property is a central 
19 The term also means “a document containing an undertaking … to pay a 
specified  amount  …  in  the  event  of  a  specified  contingency”,  or  a 
“promissory note”, both of which are suggestive of the contemporary usage 
in “insurance policy”.
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part of the state's  policy. It is a policy that gives rise to certain 
laws, such as “theft” codified into a statutory offence in the Theft 
Act 1968 in the UK, where Section 1 reads “A person is guilty of 
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another 
with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and 
“thief”  and “steal”  shall  be  construed accordingly” (Theft  Act 
1968). Private property is part of the state's policy and the Theft 
Act is an enactment of that policy, which is necessary to secure 
the stability of possessions as declared in the policy.
If we return to the claim that “copyright is policy, not property” it  
becomes  obvious  that  there  is  a  conflation  at  play,  which  is 
deployed  for  tactical  purposes.  The  choice  of  policy  over 
property is presented as a matter of tactic, rather than analysis:  
tactically it is decided to focus on “policy”, despite an analytical 
awareness that property can take on many different forms. This 
tactic  is  chosen  on  the  assumption  that  the  public  cannot 
understand  the  term  “property”  in  the  way  that  lawyers  and 
philosophers are able to.
However, property is a form of policy – or it is a manifestation of 
policy.  We  may  say,  for  instance,  that  “private  property  is  a 
central  ingredient  in  foreign  aid  policy  in  order  to  further 
entrepreneurship”  or  that  “private  property  was  central  to 
Thatcher's  reasoning  for  the  policy  to  turn  council  housing 
tenants into house owners”. Or, expressed differently:
“If it is true—as it must be—that copyright is policy, 
then  it  is  equally  true  that  all  property  rights  are 
policy” (Mossoff: 2005: 33).
The claim that copyright is a matter of policy, not property can 
also be unpacked differently. Instead of arguing whether property 
means this or property means that – in the context of what are 
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essentially  artifices  of  justice at  any  rate  –  we  can  ask  what 
debates around each of these respective issues entail. What kind 
of questions are asked in discussions about property relations and 
what kind of concepts are at play in discussions about copyright. 
Here it “is easy to see that every tangible property entitlement 
has  arisen  from  a  crucible  of  moral,  political,  and  economic 
analyses,  and thus implicates  the  same questions  about  utility, 
personal  dignity,  and  freedom that  now dominate  the  debates 
over digital copyright. The preeminent property cases that every 
law student studies in the first year of law school are exemplars 
of this basic truth” (ibid.). Nevertheless, investigating the claims 
of the “information exceptionalists” further will be instructive20.
As  part  of  the  tactic  to  substitute  policy  for  property  in  the 
context of understanding copyright, Free Culture advocates claim 
that  copyright  understood  as  property  is  a  modern  invention 
carried  out  by  scheming  corporations  using  the  rhetoric  of 
(natural)  property  to  distort  the  public  perception  of  the 
underlying and original policy of copyright (Stallman 2004)21. 
20 I  am slightly  altering  Mossoff's  (2005)  terminology,  who calls  the  Free 
Culture advocates “Internet exceptionalists”.
21 This “fact” has a curious history in itself. Hughes (2006) calls it a result of  
the “scholarly house of mirrors” (ibid: 1001) and notes that it seems to first  
appear  in  Vaidhyanathan  (2001:  11-12)  in  reference  to  Lemley  (1997). 
There is no other origin of this “fact”, which has become common currency 
in the Free Software and Free Culture movements. As Hughes writes, it was 
cited twice by Lessig in footnotes stating “the term intellectual property is 
of relatively recent origin” (2004) and “a touch less guarded … “the term is 
of recent origin”” (2001). Stallman uses the authority of “Professor Mark 
Lemley, now of the Stanford Law School” to state that “the widespread use 
of  the  term “intellectual  property”  is  a  fashion  that  followed  the  1967 
founding of … (WIPO)” (Stallman 2004). It turns out that Lemley casually, 
in  a  footnote,  mentions  that  the  “modern  use  of  the  term  “intellectual 
property”  as  a  common  descriptor  of  the  field  probably traces  to  the 
foundation of the World Intellectual Property Organization” (Lemley: 1997: 
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However, the 
“...story supposes that a multilateral treaty would be 
written and an international agency established with 
a wholly new name that no one was familiar with. In 
fact,  WIPO's predecessor international agency was 
called  the  “United  International  Bureaus  for  the 
Protection  of  Intellectual  Property.”  It  was 
commonly  known by its  French acronym,  BIRPI. 
BIRPI was formed in 1893, as a combination of two 
small  agencies  that  had  been  established  to 
administer,  respectively,  the  Berne  and  Paris 
Conventions.  Thus,  “intellectual  property”  was  a 
conscious,  nineteenth-century  category  created  to 
subsume  both  “literary  property”  (Berne)  and 
“industrial property” (Paris).” (Hughes 2006: 1005-
1006)
Further  good  evidence  for  the  tradition  of  understanding 
copyright and patents as property has been provided recently as a 
response to these seemingly misleading claims:
895;  emphases  added).  This  clearly  shows  that  he  is  not speaking  of 
copyright, but of the subsumption of all of the particular legal arrangements 
known as intellectual property rights under one common banner.  On the 
other  hand  it  shows  the  “viral  power  of  a  statement  by  a  respected 
academic”  (Hughes  2006:  1003).  Moreover,  the  publication  in  which 
Lemley gave birth to this fast circulating “fact” was in fact a book review of 
James Boyle's seminal work (1997), the work with which Boyle founded 
the cultural environmentalism movement (which has become synonymous 
with the Free Culture movement). Lemley's review was relevantly called 
“Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property”. 
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“There can be little question today that intellectual 
property assets are forms of “property.” The Patent 
Act expressly declares that “patents shall  have the 
attributes  of  personal  property”  and  the  Supreme 
Court  acknowledges them as  such.  The Copyright 
Act  states  that  “ownership of a copyright  may be 
transferred  in  whole  or  in  part  by  any  means  of 
conveyance  or  by  operation  of  law,  and  may  be 
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by 
the applicable laws of intestate succession.” (Menell 
2007: 37)
Consider  also  a  publication  that  pre-dates  cultural 
environmentalism and Free Culture:
“English  law  has  considered  copyright  a  form  of 
property. An 1842 decree asserts that "Copyright ... 
shall endure for the Natural Life of Such Author and 
shall  be  the  Property  of  Such  Author".  In  other 
decrees  the  terms  "the  owner  of  the  copyright," 
"ownership  of  copyright"  and  "proprietary  rights" 
are mentioned“ (Matuck 1993: 406; see also Mossof 
2005, 2007).
There is no evidence to suggest that intellectual property is a new 
term, on the contrary. To understand why Free Culture and Free 
Software advocates are rejecting the term, we need to understand 
their  perception  of  the  public  imagination  and  the  public's 
capacity  to  understand  issues  concerning  property  and  social 
organisation. Lessig explains:
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“If you're a lawyer, it's OK to think of intellectual 
property as  property,  because we're  trained to  use 
the word property in a careful way. We don't think 
of  it  as  an  absolute,  perpetual  right  that  can't  be 
trumped by anybody. We understand property rights 
are constantly limited by public-use exceptions and 
needs, and in that context we understand intellectual 
property  to  be  a  very  particular,  peculiar  kind  of 
property  --  the  only  property  constitutionally 
required  to  be  for  limited  terms.  It's  clearly 
established for a public purpose and is not a natural 
right … The real problem is when people use it in 
the ordinary sense of the term property, which is "a 
thing  that  I  have  that  nobody  can  take,  forever, 
unless I give it to you." By thinking of it as property, 
we have no resistance to the idea of certain great 
companies  controlling  "their"  intellectual  property 
forever. But if we instead use terms like monopoly 
to describe the control that companies like Disney 
have over art objects like Mickey Mouse, it's harder 
to run naturally to the idea that you ought to have 
your monopoly right forever” (interview in Walker 
2002).
Copyright, then, is property, for a lawyer and a philosopher, and 
property for  a  lawyer  and a  philosopher  is  not simply private 
property based on a natural right that requires no justification. 
For the “public” and in “ordinary” usages,  on the other hand, 
property is a natural right according to Lessig; Stallman agrees: 
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“I, along with most people, consider property rights 
as  natural  rights,  something  people  are  simply 
entitled  to.  They  don't  need  any  specific 
justification;  rather,  exceptions  need  justification” 
(Stallman 2007: email)22.
Do most people really think that, I wonder? However, it is not a 
question that is really relevant here. Two principles prevent us 
from entering into such questioning. Firstly, this is an academic 
and scholarly exercise, to the best of my abilities, and secondly, 
we are certainly not in the business of misleading “the public” on 
the  basis  of  the  assumption  that  “the  public”  is  unable  to 
understand  property  properly.  If  anything,  a  very  careful 
explanation to “the public” of what property means for lawyers 
and philosophers would be called for, rather than a misleading, 
non-factual  deviation.  Such  a  careful  explanation  will  be 
provided in  Chapter  2.  Let  us  here  disentangle  the  confusion, 
which will reveal a different effect of the “framing effect”.
Stallman uses the term “framing” to strengthen the Free Culture 
claim and justify the tactic to treat the public as too unwitting:
“Bringing the word "property" into contact with this 
issue in _any_ fashion frames the issue in favor of 
whoever is the "owner" of the "property".  Everyone 
can sympathize with "Keep off my property!  I can 
use my property any way I like."  And that is the 
basis that  non-philosophers will  use to respond to 
your  statement  …  In  the  "network  neutrality" 
debate,  that  framing  favors  AT&T.   In  copyright 
issues, that framing favors the author or publisher.
22 Email written December 29, 2007. On file.
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The issue here isn't the history of Western modern 
ideas  of  property  rights.   (Property  rights  existed 
before  1700.)   It's  about  what  people  (other  than 
philosophers) think today. I agree with you that, at 
the  fundamental  level,  property  rights  are 
conventions  set  up  by  society,  and  that  these 
conventions  could be set  up in  various  ways,  and 
that  we can present  arguments in favor or against 
various  proposals.   None  of  these  conventions  is 
beyond the domain of questioning, and although I 
accept the idea of property rights as the default for 
physical objects, I can consider the question. I think 
you will find that a large part of the public won't go 
that far. Merely to call patents a "property right" will 
make it difficult for many people even to entertain 
opposition to them.
You're probably aware of the effect that the way of 
framing an issue has on people's thoughts.  Perhaps 
philosophers have trained their  minds to the point 
where they can overcome this effect -- but not most 
people.   If  we frame copyright  issues  in  terms of 
"property",  that  is  in  practice  a  terrible  handicap” 
(Stallman 2008: email)23.
There is  good reasoning and cogent  argumentation behind the 
tactical choice to not frame the politics of Free Culture and Free 
Software in terms of property. However, I am wary of discussing 
legal  and  philosophical  concepts  in  a  way  defined  and 
determined in scope by popular opinion, especially in the context 
23 Emails  written  January  17,  2008,  and  January  18,  2008.  On  file.  The 
concept of “network neutrality” will be explained in Section 1.4.2
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of the free flow of information, ideas and knowledge - and a Free 
Culture in general.  I lean toward sharing knowledge and skills 
with “the public”, rather than simply assuming their ignorance.
Indeed, I argue that framing Free Software in terms of property 
has great potential. Imagine what would happen if Free Software 
was understood as  property and the public  came to learn that 
copyright,  as a form of property, could take very different and 
shared  and  collective  forms  and  be  temporally  limited.  The 
concept  of  property would be relativised,  so to speak,  and no 
longer take the particular form that appears to be tattooed onto 
everyone’s  mind,  namely  the  kind  of  private  property  that 
characterises capitalist democracy. For Ayn Rand, subverting the 
understanding of one intellectual property right means nothing 
other than the dissolution of “all other rights”:
“Patents are the heart  and core of property rights, 
and once they are destroyed, the destruction of all 
other  rights  will  follow  automatically,  as  a  brief 
postscript” (Rand 1966: 128).
Currently, property is understood in what Stallman and Lessig so 
cogently  noted  was  an  incorrect  manner:  a  natural,  absolute, 
perpetual  right  to  do  whatever  you  please.  Free  Software, 
however,  is  very  differently  configured  and  if  understood  as 
property would force upon that concept substantial reorientation. 
If  indeed  framed  in  terms  of  property,  Free  Software  might 
constitute a threat to capitalist  property, because it reveals that 
capitalist  property  is  only  one  of  many  possible  ways  of 
configuring  property.  Viewed  upside  down,  then,  the  tactical 
framing (i.e.  not in  terms  of  property)  that  is  central  to  Free 
Software politics,  serves to protect  Free Software from public 
misunderstanding,  just  as  much as  it  serves  to  protect  private 
property from public understanding.
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Understanding Free Software as property potentially provides a 
fresh  view  on  property  that  is  not  alien  to  lawyers  and 
philosophers and which would be enlightening to “the public” 
(whoever that may be). It opens a door to the politics of property, 
which,  according  to  the  Free  Software  and  Free  Culture 
movements,  is  suffused  with  misunderstandings.  A  lack  of 
information,  I  claim,  is  a  signal  to  open up  the black  box of 
property and let insights circulate freely; and not a signal to keep 
the black box of property closed. Yet, Stallman disagrees:
“Our  goal  is  to  establish  relations  about  software 
which are not property relations.  There are rules, 
yes;  but  these  rules  are  not  like  property  rights 
(unless  you stretch that  term so far  it  will  snap)” 
(Stallman 2007: email)24.
Snapping  property  is  precisely  what  I  am  aiming  at.  The 
institution  of  property  is  a  core  element  in  political  thought. 
Revisiting  it,  revising  it,  and  understanding  property  in  new 
contexts  in  the  same  way  that  you  re-read  a  novel  to  grasp 
dimensions that you had previously failed to notice, is a recurrent 
political  task.  In  times  of  change,  when  the  technological, 
cultural and social circumstances change around us, we need to 
address the core rules and laws that typify society to ensure that 
they fit and are sensible in the new context. One such core rule or 
law is property and it is necessary to continuously redefine its 
boundaries. That  is my claim, but that is  also where my view 
diverges from Stallman’s:
24 Email written May 15, 2007. On file.
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“I think the "institution of property" is an overbroad 
idea, not useful for thinking about political issues … 
If  [redefining  the  boundaries  of  property]  is  your 
goal, it seems that we are fundamentally opposed” 
(Stallman 2008: email)25.
Because of this  divergence,  the “policy approach” that  defines 
Free Software and Free Culture is  irreconcilable with an anti-
capitalist  position. That incommensurability is clearly reflected 
as Lessig states his position with regard to private property:
“I  [do  not]  condemn  “proprietary  culture.” 
Proprietary culture has been with us from the start 
and for most of our history has served creativity and 
culture well. What I do condemn is extremism—the 
shift from the standard view to an extreme version 
of  “proprietary  culture”  that  could  easily  become 
embedded  in  the  digital  economy”  (Lessig  2005: 
63).
Given  that  Lessig  primarily  sees  property  as  referring  to  the 
tangible realm only, the statement that proprietary culture serves 
us well must include reference to exclusive ownership of land, 
the means of production and distribution. In short, Lessig refers 
to  the  very  heart  of  the  capitalist  economy,  which  social 
movements all over world have resisted for hundreds of years. 
Lessig  thus  defends  the  industrial  machinery  that  has  landed 
humanity in an unprecedented ecological crisis and a relatively 
profound  and  prolonged  economical  crisis.  Private  property 
rights are embraced uncritically – except for in cyberspace – in 
submission  to  the  invisible  hand  with  the  violent  fist.  The 
25 Emails written January 17, 2008, and January 18, 2008. On file.
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uncritical view on existing property regimes is here confirmed by 
Benkler:
“This is  not  to say that property is  in some sense 
inherently bad.  Property,  together with contract,  is 
the core institutional component of markets,  and a 
core  institutional  element  of  liberal  societies.  It  is 
what enables sellers to extract prices from buyers, 
and buyers to know that when they pay, they will be 
secure in their  ability to use what  they bought.  It 
underlies  our capacity  to plan actions that  require 
use of resources that, without exclusivity, would be 
unavailable for us to use” (Benkler 2006: 23-24).
The market is a useful and integral element of a liberal society of 
the  kind  that  Benkler  is  advocating,  because  it  facilitates 
contractual relations between rational agents that enable them to 
plan  actions  and  produce  things.  The  market  is  good  for 
humanity,  as long as it behaves nicely in cyberspace. The point 
of Free Culture “is not to rethink real property but to explain the 
ways in which the economic theory of real property falls short 
when  applied  to  the  rather  different  world  of  intellectual 
property” (Lemley 2005: 1097). When it comes to the economic 
theory  of  “real  property”  as  they  call  it,  there  is  nothing  to 
question, because we can “say with some confidence that a right 
of physical exclusion works as a legal matter because its benefits 
exceed its costs” (Lemley 2005: 1099):
“Real property rights do in fact serve two valuable 
goals. First, they prevent rivalrous uses by multiple 
claimants  to  a  particular  piece  of  property  and 
therefore  avoid  the  tragedy  of  the  commons. 
Second,  they  allow  their  owners  to  invest  in 
improving or developing the property” (ibid: 1098).
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For  the  Free  Software and Free  Culture  movements,  we  have 
seen,  (mis)understanding  property  is  a  matter  of  tactic,  not 
analysis.  The  overall  strategy,  it  has  been  revealed,  does  not 
include a critical perspective on ownership in the tangible realm. 
The analysis of this chapter, on the other hand, will show that 
this tactical approach at the expense of a thoroughgoing, critical 
engagement  leaves  Free  Software  and  Free  Culture  eternally 
vulnerable to enclosure. That is because exclusive ownership of 
the technostructural underpinning of cyberspace – the materiality 
of cyberspace, as it were – permits those owners to seek rent in 
and  prioritise  traffic  on  their  network:  exclusive,  private 
ownership in the tangible realm permits an extraction of wealth 
from activities that unfold in the intangible realm. There is no 
such  thing  as  a  purely  immaterial  mode  of  production  or 
circulation, not even dreaming or telepathy come close. Nothing 
in cyberspace exists without a material foundation, as we shall 
see in the next section. For that reason, Free Culture must appeal 
to the state to ensure that capitalists play ball in cyberspace and 
do  not  extract  wealth  in  the  manner  to  which  they  are 
accustomed.
By implication, then, Free Culture requires a strengthening of the 
state – and an always strong state – while the problems of private 
property  rights  in  the  tangible  realm  remain  unquestioned. 
Consequently,  the  novelty  of  the  social  relations  for  which 
protection  is  sought  are  instead  conceptualised  in  terms  that 
rather permit for market forces to profit from them, than provide 
protection  in  a  substantial  sense.  From  an  anti-capitalist 
perspective the celebrated co-productive relations are hence lost 
in  the  sense that  they  are  not  applied  to  that  province  of  our 
knowledge and legal systems called property. It  is,  however, a 
desolate province in urgent  need of cultivation.  Understanding 
Free Software as property and commons-based peer production 
as  a  new mode of  production that  instantiates  a  non-capitalist 
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space in society on the basis of novel property configurations, I 
argue,  will  cultivate  an understanding of  property that  is  very 
instructive.
In the next section I consider the interpenetration of the tangible 
and  intangible  realm  to  further  expose  the  problems  of  the 
“policy approach” of the “information exceptionalists”.
1.4 Material foundations: on cables and machinery, food and   
shelter.
“A  child  of  five  would  understand  this.  Send 
someone to fetch a child of five” (Groucho Marx).
1.4.1 The interpenetration of tangible and intangible.
In this section I first  present some facts and figures about  the 
materiality and energy usage of cyberspatial activities and then 
briefly  consider  the  validity  of  the  capitalist  claim  that 
informational goods require investments to be made, insofar as 
the material realm is organised by means of exclusive, private 
property rights.
The  very  obvious  problem of  separating  the  intangible  realm 
from the tangible realm is that the intangible realm necessarily 
relies upon the tangible realm. It is not possible to send emails or 
surf the web without hardware and networks. The environmental 
impact of the IT industry was perhaps first noticed by the Silicon 
Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC n.d.), which was formed in 1982 
after concerned citizens discovered leaks at manufacturing plants 
of IBM and Fairchild Electronics which were the suspected cause 
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of  widespread  birth  defects  and  health  issues  in  the  Silicon 
Valley. That was of course only the beginning.
Gartner Research, in 2007, estimated that the “global information 
and  communications  technology  (ICT)  industry  accounts  for 
approximately  2  percent  of  global  carbon  dioxide  (CO2) 
emissions,  a figure  equivalent to  aviation”.  As the global  ICT 
industry  is  the  fastest  growing  carbon  emitting  industry, 
cyberspace is now a  bigger cause of carbon emissions than the 
aviation industry. Arriving at this conclusion, Gartner's research 
“included  all  commercial  and  governmental  IT  and 
telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, but  not consumer 
electronics  other  than  cell  phones  and  PCs.”  (Gartner  2007; 
emphasis added). Considering the scale of energy use required to 
power Internet services, such as search engines, will further put 
matters  in  perspective.  The  energy  consumption  of  Internet 
searches estimated by Harvard physicist  Wissner-Gross,  whose 
cyberwarming research has been corroborated by John Buckley, 
managing  director  of  carbonfootprint.com,  a  British 
environmental  consultancy  (Leake  &  Woods  2009),  and  ETC 
Group's  Jim Thomas (2009),  is  staggering when considered in 
context.  Matilda,  a  wind  turbine  decommissioned  in  2008, 
generated  more  renewable  energy  than  any  other  source  in 
history  during  its  15  years  of  activity,  namely  61,4GWh 
(Leufstedt 2008). This energy output would power approximately 
5.5  billion  Internet  searches  or  less  than  a  month's  worth  of 
current Internet search activity. Daily Internet searches constitute 
the equivalence of 2500 passengers taking a transatlantic flight 
(The Times 2006). All of these numbers are estimates, but they 
certainly  indicate  that  cyberspace  is  not  a  clean  environment. 
Moreover, they are based on Internet searches alone, and do not 
include the much more significant energy use associated with for 
instance watching  multimedia  content,  once  the search engine 
has taken you there.
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Google has responded and strongly noted that these numbers are 
much too high and that:
“In terms of greenhouse gases, one Google search is 
equivalent to about 0.2 grams of CO2. The current 
EU  standard  for  tailpipe  emissions  calls  for  140 
grams of CO2 per kilometer driven, but most cars 
don't  reach  that  level  yet.  Thus,  the  average  car 
driven for one kilometer (0.6 miles for those in the 
U.S.)  produces  as  many  greenhouse  gases  as  a 
thousand Google searches” (Google 2009).
The way Google figures it, however, leaves out external energy  
consumption (i.e.  accounts  only  for  added Google  in-house 
energy consumption) and does not even account for the running 
of  the  institution of  Google  as  such,  let  alone  the rest  of  the 
cyberspatial networks that make Google's business possible, thus 
speaking at cross purposes with Wissner-Gross and besides the 
point: the very point of cyberwarming research is to make visible 
the total energy consumption generated by cyberspatial activities 
from peer-to-peer and from consumer's home computer  through 
provider networks to the central servers and back again. That is, 
all aspects of the energy required to inconvenience the electrons 
necessary  for  a  given  cyberspatial  activity.   Nevertheless, 
considering only the  minimal amount of energy in the  optimal  
time that  a search query strains the Google machine, it  is still 
equivalent,  according  to  their  own  numbers  and  estimating  a 
current,  but  fast  growing  250.000  Google  searches  per  day 
(Tanaka  2008),  to  almost  7.5  times  around  the  world  at  the 
Equator -  per day – in the kind of car that Google uses in their 
calculation.  In  a  sense,  it  appears  to  me  that  Google  is 
corroborating, rather than refuting the estimates presented above 
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by admitting these numbers; certainly it is clear that cyberspace 
is a very energy intensive reality.
Moreover,  to take note of the full  cycle of a commodity's life 
span, the SVTC speaks of a “Global E-Waste Crisis: Threatening 
Communities Around the Globe” in connection with disposal of 
electronics discarded by consumers in the EU and the U.S.. The 
disposal is causing severe environmental and health problems in 
especially Mexico, Nigeria, China, Pakistan, India and Singapore 
(SVTC 2009).
Founder  of  the  electronetwork.org,  Brian  Thomas  Carroll, 
reminds us what these numbers actually mean:
“The grand project that is Cyberspace is grounded in 
the mundane realities of what is required to sustain 
it.  Today's  multitudinous  technological 
breakthroughs such as the Internet  are  still  reliant 
upon  ancient  and  recurring  themes  tying  the 
diagnostic  health  of  Electrical  Civilization  to  its 
sources  of  energy,  war,  and  economic  stability  .. 
Through  architectural  language,  one  can  see  the 
otherwise intangible Cyberspace materialized in the 
power,  media,  and  technological  systems  of  the 
Electrical Infrastructure. In so doing, pressing issues 
such  as  war,  energy inefficiency,  global  warming, 
pollution,  and  economic  instability  can  be 
structurally  related  to  the  seemingly  separate 
experience  online  the  Internet.  Identifying  this 
relationship  can  help  to  educate  and  organize 
citizens who want to address common yet otherwise 
ignored needs of the representative human public” 
(Carroll 2001).
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There  is  an  enormous  industrial  apparatus  underpinning 
cyberspace. From mining of minerals used in conductors through 
satellites  in  space  to  those  who  labour  in  the  very  material 
processes  of  their  production,  maintenance,  and  disposal, 
cyberspace  is  anything  but  virtual.  Understanding  life  in 
cyberspace as immaterial – a space of movement and no body – 
hides the very reality of environmental costs and exploitation of 
labour from view.
I now consider the fact that the intangible realm is indeed very 
material  from  the  perspective  of  producers  of  informational 
goods.
No  activity  can  unfold  without  material  underpinning.  Even 
knowledge creation is always bound to, and dependent upon the 
material  realm:  it  requires  at  the  very  least  a  human  body, 
including all  the material  inputs necessary for its  reproduction 
(food,  a  shelter  for  repose,  garments  to  protect  from weather, 
medicines to heal when broken); moreover, most economically 
interesting knowledge creation nowadays requires also chairs and 
desks,  offices,  books,  computers,  electricity  and  other  vital 
means  of  communication  and  information  exchange  –  indeed 
intellectual  quests  presuppose  a  form  of  flesh-and-bone 
community. 
Knowledge and information cannot be said to be entirely non-
exclusive  and  non-rivalrous,  since  it  has  clear  material 
foundations, and that is why the arguments  for privatisation in 
the  intangible  realm  are  often  so  convincing.  After  all, 
knowledge creation requires certain material conditions to be in 
place and the provision of these is an expense,  or  requires an 
investment. Privatisation (of intangible products) bears promises 
of  a  return  on  (tangible)  investments.  Indeed,  the  capitalist 
claims, not only is enclosure fair, as a means of ensuring capital 
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returns to the investor, but enclosure might even be necessary in 
order to encourage knowledge creation, for it is thought that few 
would want to invest  time,  labour  and other  capital  without  a 
promise of a financial returns. As Kenneth Arrow, also quoted 
above,  notes:  “If  information is  not property,  the incentives to 
create it will be lacking” (1996: 125).
Although the  idea  that  no  one  would  spend  time,  labour  and 
capital without taking advantage of the (incentivising) promise of 
enclosure and privatisation of their product has been shown to 
not be true at all times and in all settings (otherwise you would 
not be reading this essay about Free Software, since it would not 
exist), some strong arguments in that favour have been made. D. 
A. Burge, for example, recounts the story of Alexander Fleming 
who upon discovering penicillin in 1929 refused to pursue patent 
protection in order for commercialisation and production to take 
place  without  anyone  asserting  monopolistic  rights. 
Unfortunately, the result of this “fatal folly” was that for 14 years 
no commercial  manufacturer  was willing to  invest  the  needed 
resources  to  purify  the  drug  and  develop  the  techniques 
necessary for commercial manufacture (Burge 1984: 27).
The  interesting  question  here,  however,  is  whether  this  really 
tells us something about human innovative processes, creativity, 
and motivations in general, or whether this is not rather simply a 
story about the mechanisms through which investment decisions 
are made in capitalist economies, after all, all societies constrain 
and enable human action in particular ways26. What it precisely 
26 Consider as counter-point the story of Jonas Salk and patents. Salk invented 
the first safe and sound polio vaccine in 1955 and when asked who held the 
patent he questioningly replied: "There is no patent. Could you patent the 
sun?" The rest is history. Salk moved to Torrey Pines Mesa by San Diego to 
set up a research shop. His reputation became great for two reasons, firstly, 
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tells us is that as long as the means of production and distribution 
(in  the  tangible  realm)  are  owned exclusively,  there  are  good 
arguments for why such exclusivity should be extended into the 
intangible  realm.  As  the  two  realms  are  so  clearly  mutually 
interpenetrating there is a good case to be made for organising 
them along the same lines.
When  Benkler  states  that  asymmetrical  or  exclusive,  private 
property  “constrains  action”  (2006:  24)  he  is  right.  This  is 
obvious.  However,  the  constraints  that  I  face  in  the  tangible 
realm are primary to those that  I face in the intangible realm. 
Buying a computer is a first step and, even then, downloading 
Free  Software  will  only  be  possible  once  I  have  also  bought 
access  to  the  Internet  from  a  corporate  provider.  Pace  the 
information  exceptionalists,  the  major  obstacle  to  social 
production is private property in the tangible realm, because the 
threat  of  private  property  in  the  intangible  realm  is  merely  a 
consequence of the existing regime in the tangible realm. If the 
private  property  regime  that  governs  the  tangible  realm  was 
radically reformed, there would be little left to fight against in the 
intangible realm.
of course, he established a breakthrough in polio vaccine research - his is  
still considered the safest-and saved many lives, but secondly he did it in 
what  is  now called  “the  Salk  way”  by  insiders  of  that  industry.  Salk’s 
research facilities are surrounded by what is generally considered to be the  
densest  concentration  of  biological  science  companies  and  research 
institutes in the world. Many followed because the social mission of Salk 
resonated  with  them and  because  in  an  environment  where  information 
flows freely ideas and knowledge come cheap. “Salk attracted world-class 
scientists such as the late Francis Crick, co-discoverer of DNA's function as 
carrier of the genetic code, and Leslie Orgel, a chemist who has made major  
discoveries about the evolution of early life” (Fikes 2005).
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In the next section we shall see how the reality of ownership in 
the  tangible  realm  continually  pose  a  threat  to  the  intangible 
realm. This will become evident by reviewing the debate about 
“network neutrality”.
1.4.2 Network neutrality and the advertising company called 
Google.
"Washing one's  hands  of  the  conflict  between the 
powerful and the powerless means to side with the 
powerful, not to be neutral" (Paulo Freire).
In this section I consider a current debate concerning “network 
neutrality”  in  the  context  of  the  discussions  above  and  with 
particular  reference  to  property.  It  will  illustrate  the  interplay 
between the tangible and intangible realms and – by extension - 
how  exclusive  control  over  tangible  resources  facilitates  an 
extraction  of  wealth  from  social  relations  that  unfold  in  any 
intangible realm that is underpinned by those tangible resources. 
The  illustration  will  further  reveal  the  philosophical  problems 
and political implications of information exceptionalism.
I  take  as  point  of  departure  the  “network  neutrality”  debate, 
which is a very heated policy debate in the U.S. However, it is 
not the particularities of that context nor the debate as such that is 
important  for our present  purposes.  It  is  the principles at play 
with respect to the physicality of the Internet and the activities of 
those  who use  it  that  I  want  to  show and present  in  a  more 
general  manner,  but  with  particular  reference  to  property 
relations.
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To understand the concept of network neutrality it is necessary to 
understand the basic architecture of Internet traffic. The Internet 
is a physical network that consists of cables – through which data 
traffic flows in packets – and  switches that relay data packets. 
Data  transmitted  through  the  Internet,  such  as  an  email,  is 
disassembled  by  the  sender's  computer  into  data  packets 
consisting of 1500 characters each, which are then reassembled 
in the receiver's computer to form a whole email.
Think of a packet as an envelope with your own name – as a 
sender  -  and  the  receiver's  name  on  it  and some  form  of 
identification  that  ensures  that  each  group  of  packets  are 
reassembled correctly.  When you have sent an email (consisting 
of more than 1500 characters, including headers and other meta 
data)  it  will  leave  your  computer  in  several  packets.  These 
packets will arrive at switches that will pass them on without any 
concerns for where they are going, unless a given packet is meant 
for a destination that the switch in question recognises as being 
located  on  a  different  network,  i.e.  a  local  or  sub-network. 
Otherwise the packet is simply passed on to the next switch via 
the route that offers the least resistance. 
Because it all  happens at the speed of light it  does not matter  
much in human terms of time whether a packet passes by Tokyo 
on its way from London to New York. If the route via Tokyo is 
less congested, such as when people in Asia are asleep and thus 
not  using  the  Internet,  that  route  might  just  constitute  the 
systemically optimal solution.
It is in this way that the Internet is non-central: it has no central  
command structure without which it cannot survive. If a part of 
the Internet is broken, packets just travel by another route. Each 
switch  merely  relays.  The  Internet,  by  analogy,  is  like  an  ant 
colony. There is little intelligence, in human terms, exhibited in 
each ant,  but  as  a  whole,  on a  collective level,  they are  very 
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intelligent27.  The  Internet  is  the  whole  of  the  colony,  while  a 
single switch is an individual ant. This non-central E2E (end-to-
end) architecture is the amazing thing about the Internet and in 
terms of development it means that anyone (with the financial 
means, subject to political will) can add some kilometres of cable 
to the existing structure and thus become part of the group of 
Internet  owners.  In  terms  of  traffic  it  means  that  no  one  is 
discriminated against. All packets are equal before the Internet 
law  of  traffic.  The  openness  of  the  Internet  standards  of 
transmission is  at  the  core  of  the  Internet's  philosophy and is 
“one of the great  technological  breakthroughs of the twentieth 
century” (Naughton 1999: 20). The network is neutral, as it were.
It is this neutrality with respect to data transfer that together with 
the  materiality  of  cyberspace  underpin  Free  Culture,  which  is 
why  strong  arguments  are  made  in  favour  of  maintaining  the 
Internet's informational neutrality. In the following I provide a 
very brief overview of the network neutrality question.
Network neutrality is another way of saying “common carriage”, 
which is  an ancient  concept.  It  basically “guarantee[s]  that  no 
customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing and 
able to pay the established price, however set, would be denied 
lawful  use of the service or would otherwise be discriminated 
against”  (Noam in  Crawford  2007:  51).  In  the  context  of  the 
Internet,  network  neutrality  as  a  policy  of  intervention  is 
supposed to practically ensure  “common carriage”.  In  practice 
that  would  mean that  no  packet  of  data  is  prioritised  by  any 
switches  or  routers  of  the  Internet  and  consequently  the  anti-
27 It  is  curious  that  the  exact  opposite  can  be  said  about  humans,  who, 
according to their own terms!, exhibit a lot of individual intelligence, but on 
a collective level, according to those same terms, appear infinitely inferior 
to ants.
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capitalist  mobilisation email  can circulate  as  fast  as  the  latest 
commodity flow by Walt Disney & Co. 
The “opposite” (or absence) of network neutrality would be if 
network owners exercised their rights – as given by the private 
property  rights  regime  -  to  exclude  any  activity  from  their 
network as well as demand varying fees for any activity that they 
do allow  on  their  network.  Some  configurations  of  private 
property define the right to do just that. If I have an apple I am 
allowed to offer it to X for a tenner and to Y for a fiver. However, 
there  is  a  tradition  for  competition  policies  to  regulate  such 
matters in the realm of commerce. For instance, the local shop is 
not allowed to charge me a fiver and you a tenner for the same 
commodity.  The  mail  company  does  not  demand  to  read  the 
content of your letters and charge you more if it is a desperate 
letter to your estranged lover. The playing field is supposed to 
stay level. That is a competition aspect. On the other hand it is 
also  assumed  that  for  innovation  to  occur,  the  incentive  of 
exclusion  and rent  seeking  in  your  creations  are  needed.  The 
promise of return (as opposed to creativity in general, curiosity 
or  even  boredom)  is  what  drives  innovation  on  economistic 
terms. There is in other words a tension. 
Private  property  is  needed  for  innovation  to  occur,  but  the 
exercise of the rights of private property threatens competition. 
The  network  neutrality  debate  concerns  finding  a  balance 
between innovation and competition.  The standard function of 
private  property  structures  innovation,  while  regulatory 
intervention ensures competition. Forth and back.
“The questions raised in discussions of open access 
and  network  neutrality  are  basic  to  both 
telecommunications  and  innovation  policy.  The 
promotion of network neutrality is no different than 
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the  challenge  of  promoting  fair  evolutionary 
competition  in  any  privately  owned  environment, 
whether a telephone network, operating system, or 
even a retail  store. Government regulation in such 
contexts  invariably  tries  to  help  ensure  that  the 
short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the 
best products or applications becoming available to 
end-users. The same interest animates the promotion 
of  network  neutrality:  preserving  a  Darwinian 
competition  among  every  conceivable  use  of  the 
Internet so that … only the best survive” (Wu 2003: 
142).
A  major  concern  in  this  debate  is  vertical  integration.  An 
example  of  a  vertically  integrated  company  is  Virgin  Media. 
They produce content, such as music, they own cables through 
which their media content can be transmitted and they provide 
internet  connections.  It  is  thus possible for an Internet  user to 
stay entirely within a zone owned by Virgin. The same goes for 
AOL Time/Warner,  which also controls a supply chain all  the 
way from media production to delivery to consumers. The point 
of vertical integration is obvious: no one can pose obstacles to 
your  business  at  any  point  in  the  processes  from  production 
through wholesale and transport to retail. It is a matter of control 
and it is a form of monopoly. 
The obvious problem occurs when I have a connection to the 
Internet  with  a  vertically  integrated  provider,  but  want  to 
consume content produced by their competition, such as video 
from Youtube, which is part of Google. Such content could be 
slowed down or even blocked. A similar example is the case of a 
telephone company that owns Internet cables and blocks Internet 
telephony services, such as those offered by Skype, because they 
undermine their own business. Although threats have been posed 
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and  technologies  developed,  the  Internet  has  so  far  remained 
more or less neutral.
Those are the issues that have given rise to the network neutrality 
debate.  I  now look at  a  related problem,  which illustrates  the 
significance of network neutrality and tangible ownership.
The network neutrality debate has been unfolding since the late 
1990s. In the same period the Google corporation emerged as a 
key  player  in  cyberspace.  Google  has  become  one  of  the 
strongest supporters of neutrality on the Internet and - in part -  to 
that  end  they have  hired  as  Vice-President  and  Chief  Internet 
Evangelist  one  of  the  fathers  of  the  Internet,  Vinton  Cerf. 
Addressing the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation Hearing on “Network Neutrality”, Cerf stated 
on behalf of Google that:
“Even  as  we  welcome  the  deregulation  of  our 
telecommunications  system,  we  should  preserve 
some  limited  elements  of  openness  and  non-
discrimination  that  have  long  been  part  of  our 
telecommunications law. Absent real physical layer 
competition, Google supports a tailored, minimally-
intrusive,  and  enforceable  network  neutrality  rule 
(Cerf 2006: 7).
In  October  2009  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(FCC)  published  a  draft  for  comments  which  articulates  what 
Cerf  calls  a  “minimally-intrusive”  and  “enforceable  network 
neutrality  rule”  and  one  of  the  most  outspoken  advocates  of 
network  neutrality,  Lawrence  Lessig,  called  the  proposal 
“perfect”  (Gustin  2009).  Although  many  details  remain  to  be 
decided  upon,  the  network  neutrality  debate,  we  can  say,  has 
been won by its supporters. The FCC will intervene and regulate.
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However, tension remains, in great part because of the particular 
business model of Google.
"The  network  builders  are  spending  a  fortune 
constructing  and  maintaining  the  networks  that 
Google intends to  ride on with nothing but  cheap 
servers ...It is enjoying a free lunch that should, by 
any rational  account,  be the lunch of the facilities 
providers” (Mohammed 2006).
Let us investigate what Google's free lunch consists of. Google is 
an advertising company that uses a search engine – and by now 
many other information services - to attract customers. That is 
arguably their  basic business  model,  because that  is  how they 
profit (BBC 2005). As a user of Google you receive information 
“for free”, but your activities within the Google domain generate 
revenue from advertisers for Google. That is, in short, because 
Google  can facilitate  the  placement  of  targeted advertising on 
your screen based on your search history and habits. Google can 
do this because they have huge server farms all over the world of 
which  little  is  known.  It  is  estimated  that  Google  has  up  to 
450,000 servers in these farms (Chandler 2008:  299).  In other 
words,  Google  can  extract  wealth  from  social  production, 
because  they  own  tangible resources  through  which  the  data 
transfers  of  millions  of  people  can  be  indexed,  organised and 
otherwise  manipulated.  These  hardware  resources  interestingly 
run on Free Software. Google has thus become one of the world's 
most powerful corporations on the basis of a  software  platform 
that  is  an  outcome  of  commons-based  peer  production. 
Volunteers  have  created  the  software  that  Google  uses,  and 
volunteers put this software to work, thus generating an income 
for Google.
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The wealth extraction aspect of Google's model obviously lies in 
the  fact  that  they  own  a  lot  of  tangible  material,  i.e.  the 
computers on which this Free Software runs. With possibly half a 
million computers Google is able to provide a lot of services to 
people and in turn sell  advertising space and other services to 
companies  that  are  interested  in  online  behaviour.  The 
sophistication of Google's search engine algorithms – of which 
little  is  known –  obviously  increases  as  people  are  using  the 
search engine and as more and more behavioural data is collected 
– i.e. the more we use Google's “free services” - the more money 
Google makes. It is the users of the Internet that make Google 
function  and  it  is  essentially  social  production  that  fill  their 
coffers.
The underlying reason for the functionality and success of this 
business  model  is  that  the  network  owners  so  far  have  been 
selling  their  network  services  like  any  other  business.  Very 
simplified it means that if you want to purchase 100 terabytes of 
data traffic you pay 100 times the price  of one terabyte.  This 
business  logic  suited  everyone  until  Google  began  to  extract 
wealth from social production, which is to say that they began to 
extract wealth from social and creative activities on the Internet 
in ways that no one had done before. 
Google operates on the basis of a clever advertising structure and 
– allegedly – very sophisticated search engine algorithms. The 
secret of Google's success in economic terms is that they found a 
way to internalise the positive externalities inherent in activities 
in  cyberspace.  In  a  way,  we  are  all  commons-based  peer 
producers  for  Google.  Most  people  enjoy  Google's  business 
model, whether they know about it or not, because it includes the 
provision  of  many  “free”  services.  These  services  can  be 
considered  remuneration  for  your  “free  labour”  (see  the  next 
section). However, the network owners did not foresee that their 
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customers would be able to extract wealth from social production 
in this way. When the Internet business began, it was simply like 
selling carrots. Now things look different, because some traffic 
might be worth a lot more than other traffic.  According to the 
CEO of AT&T:
“There seems to be a mentality [on the part of online 
companies such as Google] that they can put more 
and more through our pipes for free [sic] ... We’re 
the ones who built  the network. You cannot make 
that sort of investment if you can’t make a return on 
the capital. They’re more than welcome to use our 
networks, but if they do,  they’re going to have to 
pay. It’s not free” (AT&T CEO in Crawford 2007: 
51).
The network owners  have noticed that  Google  is  internalising 
positive externalities and naturally want in on the action. That is 
business as usual and because they are in fact the owners – they 
have private property rights in those networks – they are entitled 
to  seek  rent  under  normal  circumstances.  It  is  those  normal 
circumstances of private property rights and market competition 
that the policy of network neutrality is intended to regulate. It is 
therefore  no  wonder  that  Google  is  an  outspoken  network 
neutrality supporter. 
The  important  aspect  of  the  network neutrality  debate  for  the 
purposes of this essay is that it illustrates how wealth extraction 
functions and how ownership of the tangible resources that make 
cyberspace possible facilitates that process of extraction.
In the last part of the section I will briefly look at how this kind 
of wealth extraction is becoming more and more widespread in 
cyberspace.
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The Google business model is no longer unique. It has become a 
common  way  of  doing  business  on  the  Internet.  It  is  often 
celebrated  under  the  label  “Web  2.0”,  which  by  many 
commentators is associated with “social networking”. The most 
famous  so-called  social  networking  framework  is  Facebook. 
However, Web 2.0 would more correctly be labelled “a business 
model  to  extract  wealth  from  social  production”.  Social 
networking  has  been  one  of  the  main  features  of  the  Internet 
from before the World Wide Web made the Internet popular and, 
thus,  long  before  wealth  extraction  businesses  like  Facebook 
came  along  and  provided  a  commercial  framework  for  social 
relations.
A Web 2.0 company, to explain briefly, will offer a service for 
“free”,  which  it  will  use  as  a  honey  pot  to  attract  unwitting 
worker  bees  from whose  social  relations  and behaviour  some 
wealth can be extracted. The hype around Web 2.0 concerns just 
that. The use of the Internet as a medium of social relations and 
networking, however, is nothing new.  The creator of the Hyper 
Text Transfer Protocol Tim Berners-Lee, who “isn't swayed by 
the hype machine” (Anderson 2006) says about Web 2.0:
“Web 1.0 was all about connecting people. It was an 
interactive space, and I think Web 2.0 is of course a 
piece of jargon, nobody even knows what it means. 
If Web 2.0 for you is blogs and wikis, then that is 
people to people. But that was what the Web was 
supposed to be all along … the idea of the Web as 
interaction between people is really what the Web is. 
That  was  what  it  was  designed  to  be  as  a 
collaborative  space  where  people  can  interact” 
(Berners-Lee 2006)
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What Berners-Lee is missing is that the novelty of Web 2.0 is not 
merely sophisticated tools for social networking , but rather that 
these social  networking tools often consist  of  vast  amounts of 
hardware (tangible  means of  production)  that  facilitates  social 
networking,  while  also gathering  or  handling  or  manipulating 
data  of  various  forms  extracted  from those  social  networking 
activities. 
The architecture of the Internet is defined by its end-to-end (E2E) 
or peer-to-peer (P2P) principles, as we saw above, and the Worls 
Wide Web is deliberately an extension of this architecture. Social 
networking is the very purpose of the web, but that purpose was 
meant to be between peers, from end to end, passing through a 
neutral  network  and  underpin  an  autonomous  culture;  indeed 
maintain the “independence of cyberspace”.
In the Web 2.0 economy, on the other hand, P2P autonomy has 
been  replaced  by  large-scale  tangible  infrastructures  through 
which data traffic moves and by means of which wealth can be 
extracted. “Social” networking is a highly commercial venture, 
indeed Web 2.0 is a new frontier of enclosure:
“If Web 2.0 means anything at all, its meaning lies 
in  the  rationale  of  venture  capital.  Web  2.0 
represents  the  return  of  investment  in  internet 
startups. After the dotcom bust (the real end of Web 
1.0) those wooing investment dollars needed a new 
rationale for investing in online ventures. ‘Build it 
and they will  come’,  the  dominant  attitude of  the 
’90s dotcom boom, along with the delusional ‘new 
economy’,  was no longer attractive after  so many 
online  ventures  failed.  Building  infrastructure  and 
financing  real  capitalisation  was  no  longer  what 
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investors were looking for. Capturing value created 
by others, however, proved to be a more attractive 
proposition”  (Kleiner and Wyrick 2007).
We have seen that the concept of private property is hidden from 
view in current debate about Free Culture and that its continued 
function as a means of wealth extraction most certainly obtains in 
cyberspace, even if the intangible part of that space is “kept free” 
from such direct constraints. 
The  material  necessity  for  the  intangible  realm  results  in  the 
possibility for those who own that material foundation to extract 
wealth  that  essentially  arises  from the  activities  of  every  day 
users,  most  of  whom  do  not  realise  that  in  a  way  they  are 
working for Google or Facebook when they use it.
Next  I  draw  some  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  the  above 
discussions from a critical perspective – with the role of property 
foregrounded. That leads us to Chapter 2, which will provide a 
detailed analysis of property.
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1.5 “Capitalist commonism”: capturing social production.  
“Weißt du, wie das wird?”
“Verwirrt ist das Geweb' - Es riß!”
“Es riß!”
“Zu End'  ewiges  Wissen! Der  Welt  melden Weise 
nichts mehr.”28
In this  final  section of  the  chapter  I  draw conclusions on  the 
implications of the position of Benkler - and Free Software and 
Free  Culture  advocacy  in  general  -  from  a  broad  political 
economy perspective.
While  there  are  subtle  differences  between  their  respective 
positions, they do exhibit more or less the same view on private 
property.  They  see  private property  –  which  they  simply  call 
property –  as a stable mechanism for social organisation of the 
tangible realm, but advocate that this form of ownership be not 
28 “Do you know what will come to pass? The Web is confused. It's torn, It's  
torn. Eternal knowledge is ended. The wise ones report nothing more to the  
world”. From the Prologue of Richard Wagner's Ring der Nibelungen. At 
the end of the prologue the three Norns are deliberating: Do you know what  
will come to pass? - as betrayals and lies, uncomprehending acts by would-
be innovators have led to  confusion,  the world-wide web woven by the 
knowing  makers  of  fate  rips  apart.  It  is  the  beginning  of  the  end: 
Götterdämmerung, Ragnarök,  the end of the Gods is nigh. The realm of 
ancient knowledge is  confounded,  the web of fate  no longer  holds.  The 
breaking of the web of fate, from the perspective of our analysis, can be 
understood as a prophecy of what could happen to the World Wide Web if 
the  material  conditions  of  its  existence  are  ignored  and  thus  riven  by 
disunity.
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extended to the intangible realm. That is what I call information 
exceptionalism.
In  the  property-free  intangible  realm,  instead,  they  promote 
commoning – or social production – as a means with which to 
reinvigorate democracy through the involvement of rational, but 
voluntary acts of citizens. These citizens act not because they are 
forced,  not because  they  want  to  profit  directly  in  terms  of 
monetary rewards,  but  for  reasons of  collectivity.  Sharing and 
cooperating, then, constitute a modality of agency that is to be 
reckoned with as much as the self-interest that supposedly drives 
the market. From a Free Culture perspective, it is good for the 
economy  to  nurture  social  production  because  it  is  a  very 
productive force that can overcome the too high informational 
transaction  costs  that  an  economy with  too  many patents  and 
copyrights entails. For Free Culture advocates, social production 
is  a  growth  sector,  a  novel  force  of  production  arising  from 
excess  capacity  that  ought  to  be  harnessed  to  economic, 
productive ends. I, on the other hand, believe social relations in 
cyberspace ought to be seen as cultural and creative relations, not 
merely  economically  productive relations,  and  rather  be 
harnessed for the greater good of humanity.
Before drawing further conclusions, however, I want to briefly 
present  a  counter  narrative,  which  will  put  information 
exceptionalism,  Free  Software  and  Free  Culture  politics  into 
relief.
1.5.1 Hacklabs and social centres: embodied commons.
On  the  outskirts  of  the  Free  Software  and  Free  Culture 
movements,  certain  networks,  gatherings,  online  channels  and 
independent  media  act  as  hubs  for  an  evolving  radical  civil 
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society  (Strangelove  2005;  Lovink  2005),  radiating  out  from 
squats  and  social  centres.  Seeking  a  path  away  from  liberal 
values,  the  nation  state  and  capitalist  practices,  and  towards 
notions of anti-authoritarian autonomy, mutual aid and collective 
freedom,  this  underbelly  of  the  movements  presents  views 
radically different from those of the leading Free Software and 
Free  Culture  voices.  These  differences  become  particularly 
obvious in the practices of hacklabs in social centres.
The social centre movement emerged in Italy and Spain in the 
1970s.  A social  centre  is  a  coming  together  of  communists, 
socialists,  anarchists,  goths,  ravers,  punks,  hackers,  artists, 
performers  and  various  category-defying  individuals,  who 
reclaim spaces and excess capacity in the tangible realm. In Italy 
they  have  established  a  tradition  for  seizing  “vast,  abandoned 
factories,  forts,  boarded-up  schools  and  churches  and 
transformed them into cinemas, concert halls, bars, squats and art 
galleries. Far from being scabies-infested scum pits with gutter 
punks spray-painting the names of their  favorite bands on the 
walls,  Italy’s social centers are among the country’s most vital 
cultural institutions” (Bregman n.d.).
In the 1990s, inspired in part by the Free Software movement and 
working with the new wave of social movements that became 
known as “the global movement of movements (for globalisation 
from  below)”  many  social  centres  began  to  create  hacklabs: 
spaces  where  knowledge  and  skills  are  shared,  technological 
literacy is instructed and played with. 
New systems  and  relations  are  literally  created  and  rebooted. 
Ideas circulate freely and communities and networks are built as 
social  centres  -  with  the  added  value  of  thousands  of  Free 
Software  programmes  -  emerge  all  across  Euro-America  and 
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beyond29. The London Hacklabs Collective presents themselves 
as:
“...a group of people interested in using technology 
to bring about social change. We establish, develop 
and  run  Hacklabs  -  political  spaces  used  for 
independent media, the promotion of free software 
and other emancipatory technologies. Hacklabs are 
places to share skills, to learn and to teach (London 
Hacklabs Collective n.d.)
The  physicality  of  a  hacklab  in  a  social  centre  is  partially  a 
realisation  of  the  fact  that  Free  Software  is  not  enough for  a 
knowledge  revolution,  but  that  space  with  a  roof  and  walls, 
electricity,  machines,  cables  and  connections  are  crucial  for 
agency in cyberspace. A coming together of bodies in tangible 
space, a pooling of powers in a real commons, is the nature of a 
hacklab that sets it apart from a virtual commons, which brings 
together ideas, not bodies.
These hacklabs are perfect  embodiments of what I am centrally 
arguing  for  in  this  essay,  namely that  it  is  unhelpful  to  place 
emphasis on the tangible/intangible divide in the way that some 
economists  do.  The  actions  of  those  “concerned  citizens”, 
building  hacklabs,  mixing  squatted  architecture  and  vision, 
hardware and software to create free spaces manifest  a strong 
critique of virtual commons. The hacklab defies the distinction 
29 The emergence of hacklabs also inspired a series of gatherings which I co-
organised and which was funded by the Institute for Advanced Studies at  
Lancaster University. See http://knowledgelab.org.uk  Generally we should 
here take note that contemporary anti-capitalist movements are practically 
engaged  in  prefigurative  politics:  realising  the  envisaged  world  without 
letting the ends justify any means.
129
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
between the tangible and intangible realm; indeed, the hacklab is 
deliberately  organised  across  these  two realms.  It  is  an  urban 
technological commons, but it is a commons. Additionally there 
are many rural commons, eco-villages, being recreated across the 
world, where people come together to grow vegetables and chop 
wood, in attempts to find the exit of capitalism. The re-creation 
of  the  commons  of  the  land,  as  their  destruction  were  the 
entrance into capitalism, might be the way out.
A commons is given meaning by its instantiation and realisation. 
At once the specific commons as well as the idea of a commons 
are given meaning through creation. As an idea a commons has 
symbolic  value  and  this  value  is  realised  in  the  moment  of 
creation  and  occupation  of  time  and  space.  It  is  from  the 
occupation of time and space that a commons derives its power 
as an alternative to abstract market based relations between legal 
persons  understood  as  rational  agents.  The  hacklab  is  a  real 
commons  of  people,  while  a  virtual  commons connects  ideas. 
They  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  which  should  not  be 
separated. Commons consisting only in ideas, bits and bytes need 
commons with bodies and collective spaces - and vice versa.
I now return to conclude upon my critique of the economistic 
framing of social relations in cyberspace.
1.5.2 Framed for the market.
We have seen how Benkler's work contributes to an expansion of 
the economistic framework that enables it to better capture the 
dynamics of social production. These social relations he defines 
as outside the market and property, which he otherwise considers 
very important institutions:
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“The  rules  of  property  are  circumscribed  and 
intended to elicit  a  particular datum— willingness 
and  ability  to  pay  for  exclusive  control  over  a 
resource. They constrain what one person or another 
can do with regard to a resource; that is, use it in 
some  ways  but  not  others,  reveal  or  hide 
information with regard to  it,  and so forth.  These 
constraints  are  necessary  so  that  people  must 
transact with each other through markets, rather than 
through force or social networks, but they do so at 
the  expense  of  constraining  action  outside  of  the 
market  to  the  extent  that  it  depends  on  access  to 
these resources” (Benkler 2006: 24).
Social production for Benkler, then, is the kind of social relations 
that  are  currently  not  captured  within  “the  market”,  as  that 
institution  is  traditionally  understood.  Moreover,  social 
production should not be subjected to the private property and 
contract  mechanisms  that  define  the  market,  because  these 
mechanisms  are  considered  unfit  for  the  intangible  realm  of 
information. Instead the economistic framework – the language 
of  marketeers,  essentially  –  must  be  enlarged  to  be  able  to 
systematically capture the dynamics of social production, while, 
and this is the crux of the matter,  private property and all the  
wealth concentrated on that basis remains unquestioned. In other 
words, the power amassed through the private property regime in 
the tangible  realm is  left  untouched,  but  as an organisational  
mode is rejected from the realm of ideas; because the operation 
of  existing powers  in  the  tangible  realm needs a free  flowing 
virtual  commons in  order  to  continually have access  to  ideas, 
knowledge  and  information.  The  organisational  mode  of  the 
tangible realm, however, remains. That is to say that Benkler is 
developing a framework with which to capture social production 
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without  destroying  it.  It  is  the  construction  of  “capitalist 
commonism”, to use an oxymoron, that we see in the work of 
Benkler.
Capitalist commonism recognises that existing economic powers 
cannot  sustain  themselves  without  a  minimal  degree  of 
commonalty in the intangible realm. In order for the operation of 
the  industrial  apparatus  to  sustain  itself  it  must  refrain  from 
enclosing in a traditional sense the intangible realm, because it 
needs  this  realm  of  ideas  to  feed  its  increasingly  information 
dependent,  but  heavy,  physical  machinery  of  electronic 
commodity production.
The  dynamics  of  social  production,  however,  are  captured 
through  incorporation  in  the  economistic  framework.  That 
permits  those  institutions  that  organise  themselves  with  such 
means  –  corporations,  states  and  many  NGOs  and  PGOs 
(Pseudo-Governmental  Organisations)  –  to  scientifically  grasp 
those dynamics and thus extract the surplus value that arises from 
the excess capacity embodied in relations between citizens.
The excess capacity, as we saw, is capacity in excess of basic 
requirements,  such  as  housing,  food,  time and skills.  Housing 
and food are tangible matters, while skills are transmitted most 
often through tangible means in physical spaces, most of which 
is organised by means of private property and thus – largely – 
remain in the hands of the few. Excess capacity, then, by a small 
stretch  of  the  imagination,  can  be  understood  as  positive 
externalities that cannot be internalised on the basis of the usual 
mechanisms  of  enclosure,  because  these  mechanisms  would 
destroy  the  commons  once  and  for  all.  By  analogy,  such 
enclosure is like overfishing: if you land all the fish they cannot 
reproduce themselves and you have nothing to fish for any more. 
The  virtual  commons  must  be  defended,  but  ways  to  reap  its 
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positive  externalities  –  the  economic  potential  inherent  in  the 
pooling and extraction of its productive forces – are required for 
capital interest, confined to the tangible realm, to be able to carry 
on  its  expansionary  movement.  The  information  commons, 
therefore, becomes a capitalist commons and it is Benkler's great 
achievement that  he has begun to establish a framework from 
within  which  tangible  powers  can  extract  wealth  from  the 
intangible realm without destroying that realm. From a capitalist 
perspective  this  is  genius,  because  it  resembles  a  sustainable 
fishing  policy:  we  can  keep  fishing,  but  the  fish  will  remain 
available. From an anti-capitalist perspective it is a domestication 
of  the  virtual  commons  and  consequently  a  separation  of  the 
virtual commons from the real commons, conceptualised in terms 
that relies upon state power and in turn justifies state power.
It is similar concerns that have led to Tiziana Terranova (2000) to 
argue  that  in  the  phenomena  that  Benkler  calls  “social 
production” we rather see an emergence of “free labor” that offer 
new  ways  for  capital  to  consolidate  itself  through  extracting 
wealth from social  relations  hitherto  external  to  direct  market 
relations.  Not  only  is  it  free  labour,  we  may  venture,  but 
resistance-free labour.  In  her  later  work  she  sees  Benkler's 
conceptualisation  of  social  production  as  offering  “liberal  and 
neoliberal  economics  a  refinement  of  its  logic  that  does  not 
significantly  break  with  its  overall  political  rationality” 
(Terranova  2009:  251-252).  That  reflects  the  argument  I  am 
making  here.  In  Benkler's  presentation  she  finds  that  “[n]on-
market production, in fact, is based in social cooperation, but it  
becomes economically effective, that is it achieves the status of 
an economic phenomenon” (2009: 252), because, as Benkler says 
“it  increases the overall  productivity in the sectors where it  is 
effective  ...  and  presents  new  sources  of  competition  to 
incumbents that produce information goods for which there are 
now socially produced substitutes’ (Benkler 2006: 122). In the 
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networked information economy “[s]ocial life and economic life 
would thus find a point of convergence where the former would 
no longer find its expression exclusively within the reproductive 
sphere of civil society but would become directly productive in 
the  economic  domain”  (Terranova  2009:  251).  It  is  this 
economistic perspective that domesticates social production - ties 
it to capital - and funnels the wealth created through these non-
market relations back into capital. I am arguing in this essay for a 
social analysis of property relations for exactly the reason that 
Terranova criticises Benkler's account:
“Although  nothing  in  principle  prevents  social 
production from outperforming competitive markets 
as  a  more  efficient  economic  form,  it  still  seems 
destined  to  remain  subaltern  to  the  logic  of  the 
neoliberal market as a whole … In a way it seems as 
if,  once  passed  through  the  ‘reflective  prism’ of 
political  economy,  social  production  loses  all 
potential  to  actually  produce and sustain radically 
different forms of life – which would neither coexist 
nor  compete  with  neoliberal  governmentality,  but 
which could question its very logic” (ibid: 252).
Being able to question the “very logic” of neoliberal economics, 
I argue, involves an analysis of property from a social movement 
perspective.  Paradoxically,  then,  I  develop a  view on property 
that  is  inspired  by  the  phenomenon  of  Free  Software.  It  is 
paradoxical  because  the  Free  Software  Foundation,  the  self-
organised  civil  society  institution  and  social  movement  that 
defines Free Software, does not see the concept of property as 
relevant for Free Software. They vehemently reject the idea. In 
that  sense I am standing outside the movement,  insofar as we 
understand the movement as the voice of its leaders. But why 
should we?
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Although I  argue against  their  rejection  of  property,  the  main 
purpose is not to advise the Free Software Foundation on matters 
of  policy strategy and tactics,  but  to provide the wider  global 
network of social  movements working to (re-)create commons 
with a map and matrix of property that can be used to advance 
their  causes  and  to  grasp  just  how  multi-faceted  a  concept 
property is. Understanding Free Software as property is a very 
useful  starting  point  for  transcending  existing  conceptions  of 
property,  because when understood as  property,  Free Software 
opens the door for radically different configurations of property. 
Importantly,  Free  Software  is  an  example  of  a  community 
articulating their own relational modalities and thus defining how 
they self-organise to make space for a realisation of their “needs, 
desires,  aspirations,  affects and relations” (De Angelis  2005a). 
While it is certainly an important victory for community based, 
self-legislation, it  is perhaps even more importantly a crack in 
property  where  the  light  gets  in:  if  we  inscribe  the  relational 
modalities of Free Software upon the concept of property, then 
the  concept  is  forever  changed.  In  other  words,  its  “framing 
effect” would be entirely different and informed debate become 
possible.
Above  I  used the term paradox to avoid any association with 
self-contradiction.  It  might  be  read  as  if  I  am  contradicting 
myself, declaring allegiance with social movements, then turning 
around to conceptualise the dynamics of a social movement in 
terms that  they reject.   However,  the  contradiction is  on their 
part.
The libertarian values that the Free Software and Free Culture 
movements exhibit are not liberties that were won in the struggle 
for virtual  commons and the right  to share digital  information 
and cooperate on software projects.  The freedoms upon which 
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the  Free  Software  commons  rests  –  the  liberties  that  make  it 
possible for such a movement to act and organise – are liberties 
won by struggling women and men, who with their bodies fought 
for  land  and  freedom.   The  habeas  corpus in  which  virtual 
commoners find themselves is an outcome of a struggle that has 
been unfolding for almost a millennia. Arguably, the leadership 
of the Free Software and Free Culture movements are separating 
themselves from the real commons. The commons of the land 
and the commons of the means of production and distribution are 
the fundamental  commons without  which virtual  commons are 
merely lambs for the profit slaughter. 
The view on property that is shared by the Free Software and 
Free Culture movements obviously invite a critique that clearly 
goes beyond virtual culture itself, serving as a perfect point of 
departure  for  a  critique  and  reassessment,  long  needed,  of 
property in general. Critiques and reforms are certainly needed, 
lest the promissory notes of Free Culture are to whither in the 
twilight of enclosure.
In  the  introduction  we  defined  our  revolutionary  question  to 
“How?”.  We  then  asked  “With  what?”.  By  identifying  the 
“hidden” powers of property as our answer, we must now ask 
“How  does  property  work?”;  or  “What  are  the  properties  of 
property?”.
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